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There is a pile on 
my desk that gets 
taller by the day. It 
contains proposals 
and communiqués 
issued by national 
and  international 
institutions,  and 
by  individuals  as 
well as policy advisors – all on the same 
topic, namely what should be done to put 
an end to the credit crisis, and how can it 
be prevented from ever happening again. 
The Institute for International Finance,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the  Bank  for  International  Settlement 
(BIS),  the  Finan  cial  Stability  Forum 
(FSF), just to name a few of the most 
pro  minent contributors to the debate, 
all have issued a report containing an 
inter    pretation  of  the  crisis  as  well  as 
a  list  of  proposals  for  reforming  the 
regulatory system. 
Rather than comparing or even discus-
sing these proposals, I want to      ➾
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CFS Working Paper
→   The  full  report  can  be  obtained 
from the CFS website
The paper presents a causal analysis of 
the credit crisis which started 18 months 
ago. On the basis of our findings, a list 
of  policy  recommendations  is  derived. 
These  proposals  for  regulatory  action 
differ  significantly  from  what  we  have 
seen in the debate to date.
Currently, two camps dominate the d  ebate.
According  to  the  first,  m  acroecono  mic 
view, the financial crisis has been cau  sed 
by the bursting of a house price bubble 
in the US. As a result, a s  udden shift of 
expectations led to liquidity con  straints at 
financial institutions, and strong investor 
sentiments. This is seen as one part of a 
well-known cycle, going from euphoria 
to fear, as Alan Greenspan put it. 
The Future of Securitization
2008/31
Günter Franke (University of Konstanz and CFS), Jan Pieter Krahnen (Goethe University, CFS, and CEPR)
THE CFS STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION, BY GÜNTER FRANKE 
AND JAN KRAHNEN, GIVES AN INTERPRETATION OF THE REASONS LEADING TO 
THE CURRENT FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS, AND DERIVES A SET OF CONCRETE 
REGULATORY MEASURES NEEDED TO REVITALIZE FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND 
SECURITIZATION MARKETS IN PARTICULAR. THE POLICY CONCLUSIONS WERE 
PRESENTED  ON  OCTOBER  16  IN  WASHINGTON,  AT  THE  BROOKINGS-TOKYO
CLUB-WHARTON  CONFERENCE  “PRUDENT  LENDING  RESTORED:  SECURITI-
ZATION AFTER THE 2007 MORTGAGE SECURITIES MELTDOWN”
The  second  view,  in  contrast,  focuses 
on  incentives  and  risk  management. 
Irresponsible  lending,  overly  complex 
financial  instruments  and  conflicts  of 
interest  impaired  market  transparency, 
and translated into market illiquidity.
In the present study, we add to the second 
view,  finding  incentive  misalignment 
to  be  the  root  of  the  crisis.  However, 
these incentive misalignments were not 
transparent to investors and presumably 
were not correctly reflected in ratings.
More  concretely,  one  important 
misalign  ment  relates  to  the  first  loss 
piece  in  securitizations.  Information 
asym  metries enable the originator of a 
securitization transaction to benefit from 
adverse selection and moral hazard at the 
expense of investors. The standard cure 
for these problems is that the originator 
retains a substantial fraction of the first 
loss piece. Over the years it appears that 
originators sold more and more of this 
piece,  invalidating  their  incentives  to 
safeguard the quality of the securitized 
assets.  Since  originators  refuse  to  tell 
investors  about  the  retained  first  loss 
piece, investors were not aware of this 
problem for a long time.
Another  important  incentive  misalign-
ment  relates  to  bank  manager  com-
pensation. A substantial part of the com-
pensation is an annual bonus which can 
never be negative. By setting up SIVs, 
and similar structures, and by strongly 
leveraging their activities, managers can 
raise their bonus income. Therefore we 
observe leverage ratios which endanger 
financial stability. One way to discourage 
managers from taking excessive risk is 
to  supplement  the  bonuses  system  by 
appropriate malus components.
Given  these  incentive  misalignments, 
and their impact on the quality of the 
underlying asset portfolio, once they are 
recognized they will render the valua-
tion of financial assets opaque. Opacity, 
in turn, will contribute towards a break-
down  of  asset  markets.  In  addition, 
opacity of financial asset valuation trans-
lates into opacity of institutions t  rading 
or holding those assets. Therefore, the 
risks  of  these  institutions  cannot  be 
e  valuated by peer institutions, and inter-
bank markets will collapse, too.
point at  three features of the debate 
that are unique to the current economic 
situation: the micro-macro conundrum, 
the short term-long term conflict, and 
the paucity of factual knowledge.
First,  when  the  crisis  started  in  mid 
2007, the discussion was all about poor 
lending  decisions  taken  in  the  U.S. 
mortgage  market,  allowing  people  to 
invest in real estate that had no income 
or other wealth, and borrowing way too 
much given the value of the collateral. 
The  crisis  then  unfolded,  affecting 
mortgage banks (like Northern Rock) 
and  highly  leveraged  investors  (like 
Sächsische Landesbank), then interbank 
markets.  This  is  the  microeconomic 
story. Increasingly, a second story was 
putting its stamp on the debate. Too 
low interest rates for too long a period 
had contributed to asset bubbles, e.g. in 
the housing market. It was accompanied 
by an excessive supply of central bank 
liquidity, and extreme leverage among 
financial and non-financial institutions. 
When  the  bubble  burst,  shock  waves 
were  running  through  the  financial 
system,  causing  collateral  damage 
all  along  the  value  chain,  from  debt 
origination to long term investors. The 
interplay of micro- and macroeconomic 
clout  is  a  constellation  we  have  not 
seen  in  a  lifetime  –  how  can  it  be 
incorporated into a systematic diagnosis 
of the crisis?
A second unique challenge relates to the 
inherent  conflict  between  short-term 
crisis management and long-term crisis 
prevention. While all proposals for a 
new regulatory framework that I have 
seen so far are focused on the long term, 
basically  assuming  that  an  improved 
regulatory framework can be built in 
a benign economic environment, there 
may be an additional defiance for any 
new framework, largely overlooked to 
date. The forgotten factor is the crisis 
management  currently  under  way. 
While  the  concerted  interventions 
by central banks and governments to 
stabilize banks and interbank markets 
we have seen in the past months have 
been admirably successful, at least seen 
from today, the same interventions are 
likely to be part of market participants’ 
expectations  next  time  around.  Put 
differently, it will be hard, and probably 
also costly, to take financial institutions 
through a withdrawal treatment, now 
that  they  have  had  a  taste  of  benign 
state aid. Once this crisis is over, will 
default risk still be the same bogey man 
it used to be? 
Both  conundrums,  threatening  as 
they  are  for  the  economy  out  there, 
are also eminent opportunities for us 
economists. Clearly, academic research 
on the interrelationship of micro and 
macro drivers in crisis dynamics, and 
on the interdependency of short- and 
long-term crisis management is in high 
demand  now,  and  at  CFS  we  try  to 
contribute to the debate as well (see 
our  website  for  details).  In  a  recent 
talk at the House of Finance, the Nobel 
laureate  Robert  Merton  suggested  to 
appoint  an  international  high-level 
panel, representing regulators, central 
bankers  and  academics  that  regularly 
report  on  the  safety  of  the  financial 
system.  Apart  from  the  question 
whether or not this task isn’t already 
performed  by  the  BIS  in  Basle,  the 
innovative idea of Merton relates to a 
special  data  collection  authorization 
granted to the panel. This has always 
been the dream project of us academics, 
being allowed to tailor the data set to 
the  questions  we  have,  rather  than 
the  other  way  around.  While  I  do 
not think that Merton’s proposal will 
eventually  be  realised  one  hundred 
percent, it would be a big step forward 
if  timely  data  access  for  researchers 
would be considered an adequate new 
instrument in crisis prevention.4 5
Special Survey
The  special  survey  conducted  this  time  dealt  with  the 
financial crisis and its consequences. 496 leading executives 
were  asked  a.o.  about  their  expectations  regarding  the 
duration of the crisis, as well as their views on the regulation 
of  securitizations,  the  marking-to-market  of  assets,  and 
remuneration of managers.
Index Dips Below 100 for the First Time
The latest CFS Financial Center Index survey, which took place 
in October/November 2008, produced a negative (below 100) 
index value for the first time ever. At 99, the index is 9.7 points 
lower than the previous index value of 108.7. This strong decline 
clearly reflects the negative business sentiment prevailing in 
German financial markets, and markedly deviates from the more 
optimistic expectations noted in previous quarters. 
There are significant differences between the results of branch-
specific  groups. The  biggest  decrease  in  business  sentiment 
is  registered  for  the  core  group  of  banks.  Financial  sector 
service providers, however, are cautiously more positive. In an 
international comparison, a majority believes that the financial 
crisis may have a positive effect on the importance of Germany 
as a financial center.
CFS  director  Professor  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  expects  a 
continuing negative trend in financial business for the next 
quarter.
The CFS Financial Center Index is a quarterly index that measures the evaluation and expectations of financial market 
agents for Germany as a financial center. The index is based on surveys of leading executives from the financial community 
in Frankfurt and Munich. The maximum attainable index value is 150, the minimum index value 50. An index value of 100 
indicates a neutral business sentiment.
Research and Policy | CFS Financial Center Index CFS Financial Center Index | Research and Policy
The paper develops a structural explana-
tion of the crisis. In it, the bursting of the 
house price bubble may have triggered 
the crisis, but it is not its primal cause.
The paper also proposes several measures 
to  improve  transparency  in  a  specific 
way, and it gives regulation the role to 
enforce this transparency.
1.   Markets  need  to  know  at  all  times 
the size and the fraction of first loss 
position  retained  by  the  originator. 
However,  there  should  not  be  a 
mandatory  retention  because  a  rule 
can always be gamed.
2.   Compensation  schemes  of  managers 
need  to  balance  bonus  and  malus 
components.  Again,  no  regulation 
is  required,  only  transparency  on 
remuneration  policy,  including  an 
independent  assessment  of  incentive 
properties of the scheme, e.g. by rating 
agencies.
3.   An  extra  capital  charge  should  be 
imposed  on  banks  whose  risks  are 
opaque,  reflecting  the  externality 
imposed on the market as a whole.
4.   Rating  processes  should  not  be 
regulated,  while  rating  performance 
measurement  (i.e.  the  validation  of 
ratings) should be made public. Also, 
ratings  should  provide  information 
on  incentive  alignment  in  complex 
transactions.
5.   Comprehensive data on risk exposure 
of financial inter  mediaries (a risk map) 
should  be  collected  and  published 
quarterly, signalling early warnings.
After its release, the study led to an im  me  diate 
response in the press. Finanz & Wirtschaft, for 
ex  ample, published the following article on 
October 22, 2008
CFS Financial Center Index
Project Team: Christian Knoll & Corinna Wolf (CFS)
→   For more results/information on the 
survey, please visit the CFS website or 
contact Corinna Wolf (wolf(@)ifk-cfs.de)
→   Further details can also be found at 
www.financialcenterindex.com
duration of the crisis, as well as their views on the regulation 
of  securitizations,  the  marking-to-market  of  assets,  and 
remuneration of managers.
Von Dietegen Müller Frankfurt
«DerStaat ist stark.Erkann Banken retten. Die Finanzbranche aber hat versagt.» Wer – nicht nur – deutschen Politikern zuhört, erkennt hinter diesen Formeln viel Freude an neu gewonnener Einflussnahme. Die Politik will nicht nur den regulatorischen Rahmen setzen, sondern auch mitreden, wie die Vergütungsmodelle aussehen. Für die Banken ist die Situation alles anderealseinfach. Abgesehen davon, dass sie weitere Wertberichtigungen verkraften müssen, laufen sie Gefahr, ihre Souveräni- tät zu verlieren, wenn sie Staatshilfe bean- spruchen. Die Rettungspakete sind oft mit massiven Interventionen verknüpft (vgl. rechts und Seite 34). Weil auch der grösste Wachstumsmotor der Branche – der Ver- briefungsmarkt – als Ursache der Krise gilt, dürfte er weit stärker als bisher regu- liert werden. Seine heiss ersehnte Revitali- sierung wird sich weiter hinauszögern.
Interventionen im Blindflug Das Problem aller derzeitigen Interven- tionenaberist,dasssiepraktischimBlind- flug geschehen. Kosten und Nutzen der Staatsinterventionen sind unabsehbar. Weiter besteht aber auch keine Trans- parenz, welcher Marktteilnehmer nun die Verluste trägt, die der IWF auf bis zu 1,4 Bio. $schätztundwovonersteinTeiloffen- gelegt worden ist. Dies erschwert auch die Analyse der Ursachen der Krise. Das Frankfurter Center for Financial Studies hat sich die Mühe gemacht, eine Analyse auf Mikroebene – auf Ebene der einzelnen Marktakteure – zu versuchen. Eine Studie (vgl. Eckpunkte unten) bringt interessante Zusammenhänge zutage. Ein Fazit ist, dass die Interessenmaximierung dereinzelnenTeileinderWertschöpfungs- kettederVerbriefung aufKostenderStabi- lität des Gesamtsystems ging. In grossem
Stil wurden verbriefte Kreditrisiken ver- teilt, aber es blieb intransparent, wohin die Risiken letztlich gegangen sind.
Rationales Marktverhalten
Die Studie wertet die Vertrauenskrise unter den Marktteilnehmern als rationa- les Verhalten in einem funktionierenden Markt. Es gehe nicht um Marktversagen. Zur Krise beigetragen haben auch die Ra- tingagenturen. Sie haben Verbriefungen
Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten zugrunde ge- legt,diefürUnternehmensanleihenzuver- lässig sein mögen, nicht aber für Verbrie- fungen. Verbriefungsstrukturen reagieren vielstärkerauf makroökonomischeVerän- derungen, die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit ist daher höher als erwartet. Ein Schwund des Vertrauens in die Ra- tinggüte hat den Verbriefungsmarkt zum Erliegen gebracht. Investoren, die ihre Anlagen gemäss ihrer Risikoneigung aus- suchen, hatten sich stets auf Ratings ge- stützt. Sie mussten dann feststellen, dass die vermeintlich kalkulierbaren Produkte nicht den Erwartungen gerecht wurden. Letztlich führte dies zum allgemeinen Misstrauen in die Gegenpartei und zum Kollaps des Interbankenmarktes, was ironischerweise Lehman Brothers in die Pleite trieb: Die US-Investmentbank hatte sich in den Neunzigerjahren einen Namen alsVorreiterininkomplexenVerbriefungs- strukturen gemacht. Eskaliert ist das Problem, weil sich zu viele Akteure auf die Systemstabilität ver- lassen haben. Leichtfertig sind Kreditrisi- ken verbrieft und externalisiert worden, was in der Summe das System instabil ge- macht hat. Dies konterkariert die an sich sehr sinnvolle Innovation der Verbriefung: Durch sie erst werden Individualrisiken gebündeltundhandelbargemacht.Prinzi- piell sinken die Kosten und das Risiko für den einzelnen Marktteilnehmer, da er di- versifizierte Risiken erwirbt. ImbisherigenVerbriefungsprozess sind der Schöpfer des Kredits, der Liquiditäts- geber, der Arrangeur und der Berater in seltensten Fällen miteinander identisch. Dadurch entsteht ein Informationsgefälle. Kaum jemand hat Einblick in die zugrun- deliegenden Risiken, zumal spezifische Vertragskonstruktionen Ausfallrisiken erst nach einigen Jahren offensichtlich werden lassen.AmEndemusste niemandadäquat dafür geradestehen, glaubt die Studie. Eine wesentliche Ursache dafür liegt in mangelhaften Anreizsystemen, welche die Interessen der Risikomanager nicht mit denenderInvestoreninEinklanggebracht haben.Bankenkonnten,ohneselbstoffen- sichtlicheRisikeneinzugehen,fastkosten- los einen Erstprofit in der Verbriefung er- zielen. Die Manager profitierten von mög- lichst grossen Verbriefungsvolumen. Der Bonus, den sie erhielten, berücksichtigt aber nicht das über die Zeit verteilte Aus- fallrisiko im Ertragsstrom der Verbriefung.
Anders,alsdieöffentlicheMeinungsug- geriert, lässt sich dabei belegen: Je höher der Bonusanteil bezogen auf das Fixgehalt ist, desto konservativer agieren die Mana- ger. Viele Banken, deren Manager hohe Boni bezogen, haben folgerichtig oft nur erstklassige Tranchen auf der eigenen Bi- lanz. Risikoreiche Tranchen wurden an Dritte wie Hedge Funds «ausgelagert».
Leverage-Aufbau wurde belohnt Fatalerweise haben Manager aber auch über den Bonus davon profitiert, wenn sie denHebelaufdasEigenkapitalvergrössert haben. In der Krise hat sich die Kapital- unterlegung vieler Finanzhäuser in Bezug zu den eingegangenen Risiken als viel zu gering herausgestellt. Wäre der «Leve- rage»-Aufbau durch eine Bremse im Ver- gütungssystem geahndet worden, wäre es wohl kaum zu Exzessen gekommen. Als Folge davon fordern nun Politiker – undauchdieEidgenössischeBankenkom- mission – die Einführung einer bestimm- ten Mindestgrösse des Eigenkapitals zur Bilanzsumme oder einen Mindesteigen- kapitalanteilinVerbriefungen.Einheitliche Vorgaben unabhängig von der zugrunde- liegenden Risikostruktur sind aber kaum zielführend, glaubt die Studie. Stattdessen sollte der Sanktionsmechanismus dem Markt überlassen werden. Wenn transpa- rent ist, wer welche Risiken zu welchen Konditionen eingeht, würde dies zu einer risikoadäquaten Preisfindungführen. Hier dürfte der Regulator gefragt sein, da die Marktteilnehmer bisher keine Anstalten machen, die Transparenz zu erhöhen.
TragödiederAllmend:DieWiesegehtzugrunde,weilzuvieleDorfbewohnerzuvieleTiereweidenlassen.AnalogkipptdasFinanzsys-
tem, wenn zu viele Akteure sich auf die Systemstabilität verlassen und ihre Kreditrisiken externalisieren.  BILD: U. BRINKHOFF
Transparenzgebot 1: In allen Transaktionen mit besicherten Kreditprodukten (Asset-ba-
cked Securities) wird offengelegt, welcher Marktteilnehmer beispielsweise die besonders
verlustanfällige Eigenkapitaltranche (First Loss Piece) hält. Transparenzgebot 2: In der Wertschöpfungskette des Verbriefungsprozesses muss offen-
gelegt werden, auf welche Grundlage sich das Vergütungssystem stützt. Also ob es sich
um ein Vergütungssystem handelt, das eher eine kurzfristige Ertragsentwicklung belohnt
(Frontend-loaded) oder eine langfristige Ertragsentwicklung (Backend-loaded). Zudem
sollte ein Gleichgewicht von Bonus- und Malusbestandteilen im Vergütungssystem durch-
gesetzt werden. Dazu muss eine geeignete Vorgehensweise für die Berichterstattung
entwickelt werden. Zur Umsetzung der Berichterstattung scheinen Ratingagenturen und
Buchprüfer die geeigneten Intermediäre zu sein. Transparenzgebot 3: Der Informationsgehalt von Ratings für Unternehmensanleihen
und für Verbriefungen muss durch unabhängige und glaubwürdige Institutionen wie
Aufsichtsbehörden und Buchprüfer validiert werden. Transparenzgebot 4: In die Bankenregulierung sollen über die risikoorientierten Kapital-
kosten hinaus auch transparenzabhängige Kapitalkosten einfliessen. Die Beurteilungs-
parameter, die den Grad der Transparenz beziehungsweise Intransparenz (Opacity) mes-
sen, müssen erst noch entwickelt werden. Transparenzgebot 5: Die offenen Risikopositionen der einzelnen Finanzeinrichtungen
sollen grenzüberschreitend zentral und über die Zeit erfasst werden. Damit wird klar,
welche Risiken die Finanzbranche insgesamt eingeht und ob daraus Systemrisiken ent-
stehen könnten. 
Quelle: The Future of Securitization, CFS, Franke/Krahnen 2008
Leben im US-Energiesektor Die Kaufangebote für Constellation und NRGhabenLebenindenUS-Energiesek- tor gebracht. Dieser steht vor einer Kon- solidierungswelle. Die Versorger müssen Atomenergiekapazität zukaufen und Grösseerreichen,umkünftige CO2-Steu- ernvermeidenundKraftwerksprojektefi- nanzieren zu können. Seite 38
«Value-Anleger kaufen jetzt» Thomas Shrager, Partner der New Yorker Investmentboutique Tweedy, Browne, spricht im Interview über die Chancen, diedieVerkaufswellenandenBörseneröff- net haben. Langfristig orientierte Anleger sollten seiner Meinung nach jetzt kaufen. Zu seinen Favoriten zählen 3M, Swiss Re, Nestlé und American Express. Seite 37 Finanzkrise legt diverse Mängel offen
Studie kritisiert mangelhafte Anreizsysteme und Intransparenz – Pauschale Regulierung ist kein guter Ansatz
Deutsches Rettungspaket
Bisher wenig
Anklang
Eckpunkte für Transparenz und Stabilität
Daimler doppelt betroffen Der deutsche Fahrzeugbauer leidet un- ter der Schwäche des Automobilmarkts und unter der Kontraktion des Nutzfahr- zeugsektors. Die düsteren Aussichten erzwingen eine Neueinschätzung der Ertragsperspektiven. Die ist an der Börse so pessimistisch ausgefallen, dass die Aktien unterbewertet sind. Seite 35
Von Hans Martin Kölle Hamburg
Die meisten deutschen Banken verhal- ten sich noch distanziert gegenüber dem Gesetz zur Stabilisierung des Finanz- markts, das die Berliner Regierung in der vergangenen Woche im Eiltempo vorbe- reitet und durch das Parlament gebracht hat.ZumBeginndieserWochehatdieRe- gierung in der Form einer Rechtsverord- nung die einzelnen Regeln festgelegt, die von den Finanzinstituten beachtet wer- denmüssen, wennsiedasRettungspaket in Anspruch nehmen. Die Strenge dieser Bedingungen ist in Kritik geraten; sie gilt als ein Grund für das zögerliche Verhal- tenderBanken.DerandereGrund istdie Furcht, dass die Bonität einer Bank, die alleinundallzueifrignachdemRettungs- ring greift, leiden könnte.
EZB lobt das Modell
Bisher hat nur die Bayerische Landes- bank (Bayern LB) ihre Teilnahme an dem Rettungsplan angemeldet. Die HSH Nordbank und die West LB zeigen Inte- resse an der Nutzung der Liquiditätsga- rantien, während die anderen öffentlich- rechtlichen Landesbanken keine Not- wendigkeit dafür sehen. Auch von den Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken verlautet, dass ihre Finanzlage solide sei undkeinBedarfanstaatlichenHilfenbe- stehe. Ein gemischtes Bild bieten die pri- vaten Banken. Während Josef Ackerman, Vorstandschef der Deutschen Bank, ver- kündete, sein Institut benötige kein Kapital vom Staat, lassen andere Banken Interesse zumindest an einer Prüfung desHilfsangebotserkennen.DasDirekto- riumsmitgliedderEuropäischenZentral- bank, Jürgen Stark, lobte das deutsche Stabilitätsprogramm als einen guten Weg zur Behebung der Liquiditäts- klemme und empfahl den betreffenden Finanzinstituten, daran teilzunehmen. Insgesamt wendet der Staat für das Massnahmenpaket 500 Mrd. € auf, die in einen Nebenhaushalt eingebracht wer- den. Dieser Fonds wird von einer neuen Anstalt öffentlichen Rechts, der Finanz- marktstabilisierungsanstalt (FMSA), ver- waltet, die dem Finanzministerium un- tersteht. Die Mittel werden für drei Zwe- cke eingesetzt: Erstens stehen 400 Mrd. € als Bürgschaften zur Absicherung von Refinanzierungsgeschäften zwischen Banken zur Verfügung («Garantieüber- nahme»), wodurch die Liquiditätseng- pässe vermieden werden sollen. Zwei- tens können weitere 80 Mrd. € für staat- liche Beteiligungen am Eigenkapital von Banken verwendet werden, um die oft überdehnten Kernkapitalquoten wieder auf ein tragbares Niveau von rund 9% zu bringen («Rekapitalisierung»), sowie für die Übernahme von dubiosen Posten
Fortsetzung auf Seite 33 mit:
Asset Management
www.llb.li
Startklar für Hochleistung. Mit unseren Fonds. Value Made in Liechtenstein.
Kapitalmangel der US-Banken
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Widerstandsfähiges Europa
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Nachhaltigkeit anvisiert Anzeige
Ausland
Finanz und Wirtschaft  
Mittwoch, 22. Oktober 2008 Nr. 84 Seite 31
→ All working papers can be found on the CFS website.
Duration of the crisis:
Difference to 100%: no statement
Securitization:
Compensation scheme for bank managers:6 7
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Europa-Strategien im Immobilien Investment Banking
European Strategies in Real Estate Investment Banking
 
17 September 2008 
A speech by Bernd Knobloch
On the 17th of September 2008 Bernd Knobloch, former chairman of the board of directors for Eurohypo AG 
and former member of the board of directors for Commerzbank AG, held a speech on European strategies 
in real estate investment banking titled “Europa-Strategien im Immobilien Investment Banking” in the CFS 
Colloquium series. 
After  being  introduced  by  Professor 
Raimond Maurer (Center for Financial 
Studies  and  Goethe  University), 
Knobloch  started  by  asking  whether 
real estate will keep its importance for 
investment banking in the future. 
He then described the development of 
real estate investment banking towards 
an  asset  class  of  its  own:  the  rise  of 
cross  border  real  estate  trading;  the 
importance  of  financial  engineering; 
and  now  the  abrupt  ending  after  the 
subprime crisis. According to Knobloch, 
the  subprime  crisis  was  based  on  the 
assumption that real estate prices would 
keep  growing  and  that  interest  rates 
would  stay  low.  For  a  long  time,  this 
allowed  high  returns.  However,  when 
the  period  of  low  interest  rates  came 
to an end, the subprime crisis emerged 
and  credits  defaulted.  Following  the 
financial crisis, investment in real estate 
almost no longer exists as mistrust has 
become too widespread. Today, financial 
investments in real estate are again “on-
balance  sheet”,  which  limits  markets’ 
scope.
One crucial element in fostering the rise 
of this crisis was the role of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve. Its expansionary policy 
over several years, said Knobloch, incited 
investors  to  increase  their  leverage 
in  order  to  raise  returns.  Given  good 
ratings from rating agencies, institutional 
investors invested large amounts in all 
asset  classes  which,  in  turn,  increased 
asset prices. When the U.S. Fed raised its 
target rate, many credits in the subprime 
sector defaulted, triggering the financial 
turmoil in the United States.
With  respect  to  the  critical  financing 
situation, Knobloch stressed the revival 
of traditional financial instruments such 
as the German Pfandbrief, which, though 
highly regulated, currently have strong 
advantages in terms of raising liquidity.
As regards an outlook for the duration 
of the current financial crisis, Knobloch 
said  that  the  situation  is  not  likely  to 
improve prior to the end of 2009, and 
that  one  should  now  concentrate  on 
reconditioning and recapitalizing banks. 
However, and with regard to his initial 
question  about  the  future  role  of  real 
estate  investment  banking,  once  this 
crisis  is  over,  it  would  be  regrettable 
if  real  estate  investment  banking  was 
relegated  to  a  niche  existence  within 
investment banking.
Knobloch  then  proceeded  to  highlight 
what the real estate branch has learned, 
namely:  that  economic  development, 
particularly  within  the  real  estate 
branch, is cyclical; that one should not 
only rely on complicated mathematical 
instruments but also on common sense; 
that stronger regulation is not the correct 
answer  because  it  only  seems  more 
secure (in reality regulators were as well 
surprised by unexpected developments 
in  the  markets);  that  the  solution  to 
the  problem  has  to  help  coping  with 
moral  hazard;  that  rating  agencies  are 
not  unimpeachable;  and  that  more 
transparency is necessary.
Marcel Bluhm (CFS)
Bernd Knobloch
Brauchen Emittenten noch Banken?
Do issuers still need banks? 
20 August 2008 
A speech by Dr. Kurt Bock (CFO, BASF SE)
Kurt Bock, Chief Financial Officer of BASF SE, was a guest speaker at the CFS Colloquium on August 20, 
2008. After a short introduction by Jan Pieter Krahnen (Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University), 
he started his talk by acknowledging that issuers do indeed still need banks, given that we live in a world 
with imperfect capital markets. The question to be posed is: for which businesses and to what extent should 
issuers rely on the services of banks?
The current financial crisis has severely 
affected  banks  and  other  financial 
intermediaries, and their credibility has 
been corroded. Issuers, although they 
still need banks, have to worry whether 
banks can still deliver the service they 
require. Bock also noted that his firm 
has had no funding constraints in the 
financial  markets  so  far  and  that  its 
relative credit strength in contrast to 
the financial sector had improved.
Bock  continued  with  a  theoretical 
consideration of the topic. Banks are 
Kurt Bock
CFS Colloquium – Upcoming Event 2009: 
„Entwicklungsperspektiven für das Private Equity Geschäft in Europa“
Johannes P. Huth (Head of European Operations, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. Ltd.)
important  actors  in  the  debt/equity 
origination  process.  Their  role  of 
intermediating services and information 
between  corporates  and  investors  is 
essential. In addition to the brokerage 
services  they  provide,  banks  play  a 
crucial role in generating information 
about  corporates  and  certifying  such 
information for investors.
Bock explained that due to deregulation 
and  technological  progress  the 
landscape  for  intermediation  is 
currently  changing,  thus  allowing 
investors  and  corporates  to  interact 
directly.  This  direct  auctioning  of 
securities  has  certain  advantages  and 
disadvantages for an issuer. On the one 
hand,  fees  and  indirect  issuing  costs 
are  lower  and  price  setting  is  more 
transparent.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
information generation and brokerage 
services traditionally offered by banks 
are lacking.
Market  acceptance  of  securities 
that  are  directly  auctioned  through 
the  internet  depends  on  the  type  of 
security  involved.  The  potential  for 
disintermediation  varies  with  the 
quality of the issuer and the degree to 
which the product can be standardized 
and  made  transparent.  Market 
acceptance  of  direct  issuance  can  be 
high  for  certain  highly  standardized 
products, such as commercial paper.
Bock  then  described  the  current 
position of the BASF Group. He gave an 
overview of the source and use of BASF 
funds during the period 2003 to 2007, 
showing that a large portion of funds 
were  used  for  acquisitions,  dividend 
payments  and  share  buybacks.  In  his 
speech, Bock gave further details about 
BASF’s  strategy  with  regard  to  these 
topics. He also showed that company 
debt has increased over the last years 
due  to  acquisitions,  and  that  a  great 
part  of  this  debt  has  been  financed 
by  issuing  commercial  paper,  largely 
through direct auctioning.
Bock concluded that disintermediation 
can be pursued to a certain extent, but 
this does not make banks redundant.
Lut De Moor (CFS)8 9
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Joint Lunchtime Seminar Series
Since 2001 the Joint Lunchtime Series 
has  been  organized  by  the  CFS,  the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the ECB. It 
creates a platform for economic experts, 
particularly  in  the  area  of  monetary 
policy, to present their current research 
findings to a selected circle of central 
bankers  and  macroeconomists.  This 
year,  the  three  organizers,  Günter 
Beck  (CFS),  Mathias  Hoffmann 
(Deutsche  Bundesbank)  and  Bartosz 
Mackowiak (ECB), have again invited 
a  number  of  economic  professionals 
from academia, central banks, private 
institutions  and  consulting  companies 
from  all  over  the  globe.  Besides 
discussing the most recent findings of 
their  research  projects,  many  guest 
speakers  have  also  addressed  various 
aspects of the financial turmoil.
Stephan Sauer (ECB), for example, 
provided a framework for analyzing the 
emergency liquidity assistance provided 
by  central  banks  to  the  financial 
markets in response to aggregate and 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. His model 
brings  together  the  microeconomic 
view of liquidity as the ability to sell 
assets quickly and at low costs, as well 
as the macroeconomic view of liquidity 
as a medium of exchange that influences 
the aggregate price level of goods. The 
central bank is confronted with a trade-
off between limiting the negative output 
effects of dramatic asset price declines, 
on the one hand, and more inflation on 
the  other.  Moreover,  the  anticipation 
of  central  bank  intervention  causes  a 
moral  hazard  effect  among  investors. 
This  gives  rise  to  the  possibility  of 
an  optimal  monetary  policy  under 
commitment.
A presentation on liquidity and liquidity 
risk premia in the credit default swaps 
(CDS) market was held by Frank de 
Jong (Tilburg University). Specifically, 
he developed a framework for studying 
the effect of liquidity on prices of CDS. 
He found that the exposure to credit 
risk is priced and provided evidence of 
a liquidity premium attributable to the 
protection  seller.  This  liquidity  effect 
is  mainly  due  to  expected  liquidity 
rather  than  the  liquidity  risk  itself. 
His  results  imply  that  CDS  spreads 
cannot be used as frictionless measures 
of default risk, as is often done in the 
recent literature.
Matteo Iacoviello (Boston College) 
focused  on  the  housing  market  and 
investigated  the  consequences  of  an 
increase  in  individual  income  risk 
and  a  decrease  in  down-payment 
requirements  for  aggregate  volatility. 
In analyzing this issue, he made a clear 
distinction between the period from the 
1950s through 1970s, when individual 
risk was relatively small and maximum 
loan-to-value ratios were low, and the 
period from the 1980s through today, 
characterized by high individual risk and 
high loan-to-value ratios. In the earlier 
period,  precautionary  saving  is  small, 
wealth-poor  people  are  close  to  the 
maximum borrowing limit, and housing 
investment, home ownership and debt 
closely track aggregate productivity. In 
the later period, precautionary saving 
becomes  larger  as  a  result  of  higher 
idiosyncratic risk, wealth-poor people 
borrow  less  than  the  maximum,  and 
become  more  cautious  and  able  to 
self-insure  in  response  to  aggregate 
shocks.  Consequently,  the  correlation 
between  debt  and  economic  activity 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  sensitivity 
of  housing  investment  to  aggregate 
shocks  on  the  other,  are  lower,  as 
in the data. Quantitatively, his model 
explains  (i)  30%  of  the  reduction  in 
the volatility of household investment; 
(ii) the sharp decline in the correlation 
between household debt and economic 
activity; (iii) between 5 and 10% of the 
reduction in the volatility of GDP.
Celia Wieland (CFS)
David Lopez-Salido
(Federal Reserve Board Washington)
Harris Dellas (University of Bern)
Kai Leitemo 
(Norwegian School of Management)
Refet S. Gürkaynak 
(Bilkent University)
Silvana Tenreyro 
(London School of Economics)
Carlos Thomas (Banco de España)
Olivier Pierrard 
(Banque Centrale du Luxembourg)
Karl Schmedders 
(Northwestern University)
Steve Ambler (University of Quebec)
Øyvind Eitrheim (Norges Bank)
Sergey Slobodyan (CERGEI-EI)
Eric Jondeau 
(HEC University of Lausanne)
Ernesto Pastén 
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Juan Carlos Conesa 
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Kevin Sheedy 
(London School of Economics)
Giovanni Favara 
(HEC University of Lausanne)
Matteo Iacoviello (Boston College)
Glenn D. Rudebusch 
(Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
Michael Reiter 
(Institute for Advanced Studies)
Stephan Sauer 
(European Central Bank)
Gerhard Sorger 
(University of Vienna)
Tom Cosimano 
(University of Notre Dame)
→   For further information and registration please 
contact Celia Wieland, email: JLS@ifk-cfs.de
In the second half of 2008, the CFS has welcomed the following speakers:
Bartosz Mackowiak, Mathias Hoffmann, Günter Beck 
CFS Presidential Lectures
Über die Währungsunion zur Politischen Union in Europa?
Der Euro – Währung ohne Staat
Via Monetary Union towards a Political Union in Europe?
The Euro – A Currency without a State
15 October 2008 
Otmar Issing
On the 15th of October 2008 CFS President Otmar Issing 
gave  a  lecture  on  the  topic  of  political,  economic,  and 
monetary  integration  in  Europe.  Issing  spoke  about  the 
economic and political achievements in Europe and about the 
challenges ahead. The following paragraphs contain a brief 
summary of the key issues featured in this speech.
The term “Europe”
Issing began his presentation by looking at the origins of the 
term “Europe” and the concept it has come to represent. 
Europe was initially a predominantly geographical concept 
whereas nowadays this is just one aspect of a many faceted 
entity  with  common  cultural  roots  and  common  ideas  of 
freedom and human rights.
After the Second World War, the western world usurped the 
term “Europe” and used it to denote its sphere of influence. 
First of all there was the European Coal and Steel Community 
Otmar Issing10 11
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(ECSC)  followed  by  the  European  Economic  Community 
(EEC), the European Monetary System (EMS) and, finally, 
the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU).  Countries  in  the 
geographical west laid claim to the term since the first steps 
were taken towards integration.
Europe as political goal
In  post-war  Europe,  the  grounds  for  striving  towards 
integration were in the first place political, stemming from the 
desire to avoid another war at any cost. However, at that time 
the notion of fully-fledged political integration with common 
statehood for a large number of countries was inconceivable. 
Therefore,  success  could  only  be  booked  through  specific 
economic initiatives by a smaller nucleus of countries.
Justifiably, the Schuman Plan, initiated in 1950, can be seen 
as  the  starting  point  of  the  European  integration  process. 
Although the motive for founding the ECSC was political, the 
instrument used was that of economic cooperation. Soon it 
became clear that this was the only way to move forward. Any 
effort to make progress at the political level failed.
On  1  January  1958  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community  came  into  effect  between  the  six 
founding countries. The first enlargement of the EEC occurred 
in 1973. It was clear that the integration process could not 
follow the path of sectoral integration – as was initially the 
case with the ECSC – nor could it be reached via supranational 
statehood. Therefore, the basic aim was to create a single 
European  market.  This  market  integration  could  only  be 
reached when competition distortions were lifted. This was 
realized via four principles of economic freedom, i.e., the free 
movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The biggest 
change, however, took place in 1992 when the EEC became 
the European Union and the fall of the so-called Iron Curtain 
had allowed expansion to the East. 
The role of a single currency
The start of the monetary union raised the integration process 
to a new level. On the one hand, the introduction of a single 
currency stood for the accomplishment of the single market. 
Considering the volume that current speculative attacks on 
currencies could potentially reach, it is not hard to imagine the 
impact the current financial crisis would have had if Europe 
were  still  to  have  its  national  currency  regimes.  Despite 
central bank interventions, a breakdown of the exchange rate 
system might have been unavoidable. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  impact  of  introducing  a  single 
currency,  however,  extended  beyond  effects  of  a  solely 
economic  nature.  Indeed  it  also  meant  that  participating 
countries were not only required to surrender part of their 
sovereignty  to  the  European  Central  Bank  but  they  were 
to some extent even compelled to relinquish part of their 
identity by giving up their local currency. 
The single currency as catalyst  
for political unification?
In  the  1960s  and  1970s,  there  was  much  debate  about 
which  policies  were  most  likely  to  be  successful  with  a 
view to achieving European integration. At one end of the 
spectrum were those who advocated a step by step approach 
to dismantling intra community barriers, a process which 
would ultimately culminate in a single currency, and on the 
other  hand  there  were  those  who  believed  that  monetary 
integration should in fact be amongst the first steps to be 
taken and would automatically lead to the necessary economic 
adjustments. Elements of both approaches are manifested in 
the Maastricht Treaty: the “economistic” view is reflected in 
the demand for compliance with the convergence criteria and 
the “monetaristic” approach is reflected in the fixed starting 
date set for the monetary union.
Irrespective of any such economic considerations, politicians 
in Europe have, time and again, tried to use the monetary 
union  as  a  stepping-stone  towards  political  unification.  A 
statement such as “L’Europe se féra par la monnaie ou ne 
se féra pas” (by J. Rueffs, 1950) reflects this attitude well. 
Many politicians – such as Richard von Weizsäcker or Jacques 
Chirac  –  saw  the  European  single  currency  as  a  strategic 
instrument for foreign policy interests.
Issing  warned  against  loading  a  political  mission  onto  the 
single currency. The notion, indeed the hope, that a monetary 
union  could  be  tied  to  expectations  that  reach  beyond 
economic issues has at the same time been a major fear of 
many politicians, such as Margaret Thatcher. She was not 
prepared to accept the inevitable loss of sovereignty in many 
fields that a single currency implies.
Consequences for fiscal policy
The Stability and Growth Pact is meant to fill a “political 
gap” in a European Monetary Union. As sovereignty over 
fiscal  policy  in  principle  remains  at  the  national  level, 
a  suitable  framework  was  needed  to  keep  the  national 
budgets in line with the common monetary policy goals. By 
introducing fiscal rules, the EU member countries should be 
prevented from drifting towards imprudent fiscal policies. 
Issing pointed out that the pact requires member states to 
comply with and give priority to the European rules. This, 
however, can lead to a conflict with national interests of a 
country. According to Issing, this conflict cannot be solved 
by eroding national fiscal sovereignty. He sees no need for 
the creation of an “economic government” as proposed by 
President Nicolas Sarkozy. Firstly, the European Council has 
the  necessary  mandate  to  take  necessary  decisions  within 
the scope of the Stability and Growth Pact. Secondly, this 
economic government could undermine the constitutionally 
guaranteed independence of the European Central Bank. 
Europe and the financial crisis
The current financial crisis demonstrates the weaknesses of 
Europe’s unfinished political house. Spillover effects of the 
crisis are evident throughout the EU, but the member states 
are  experiencing  difficulties  in  finding  a  balance  between 
national and European interests. Unilateral measures adopted 
by individual member states can have a negative impact on 
many or all of the other states. Issing thus emphasized that 
the principle of a single market requires coherent rules. 
With regard to the creation of a special European rescue 
fund, Issing stressed that this would need not only acceptance 
by local parliaments but also by the population as a whole.
Nonetheless, as Issing also pointed out, the financial crisis 
undoubtedly offers opportunities for finding new European 
solutions for financial market supervision.
Can the monetary union in Europe survive  
without a political union?
In the foreseeable future, the Euro will most probably remain 
a currency without a state. Helmut Kohl was convinced that 
“a monetary union without political union is doomed to fail”. 
Have we created a constellation that is doomed to collapse 
because of the single-handed start of the currency union?
The ECB’s single monetary policy has led to a situation that 
requires certain minimal conditions to be fulfilled in order 
to be successful. These comprise a fiscal policy in line with 
the monetary goals of the ECB as well as flexible markets, 
in particular flexible labor markets. Substantial progress has 
been made but still there is much to be done.
Discussions about the future of political union are mostly 
raised in connection with demands for a common foreign 
policy and defense policy. Progress in these fields depends 
entirely on the political willingness of member states to meet 
these demands, and it is only when it comes to the issue of 
financing them that the Euro comes into play. According to 
Issing, this shows, once again, that a political union cannot be 
reached through the backdoor of a monetary union.
The importance of a stable currency
Today’s Europe is torn between its single market subscribed 
to  by  all  member  states,  a  monetary  union  formed  by  a 
smaller  group  of  states,  and  the  controversy  surrounding 
the notion of political union. Europe’s success is based on 
its economic achievements with the single market and the 
creation of a stable currency.
A stable currency can only be ensured by an independent 
central bank that can take decisions without being influenced 
by  political  interests.  The  demand  for  “apolitical  money” 
was  reflected  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  This  requirement 
should not be violated as it safeguards stable money and the 
economic success of Europe. Monetary stability is a condition 
sine qua non for a proper functioning of the markets.
Whether the Euro can contribute to a European identity and 
help promote political union is hard to say. However, a stable 
Euro and monetary stability are the basic foundations for any 
remodeling of Europe.
Lut De Moor (CFS)
CFS Presidential Lectures – Upcoming Event:
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IMF-CFS Conference  
“A Financial Stability Framework for Europe: 
Managing Financial Soundness in an Integrating Market”
26 September 2008
Frankfurt am Main
How should financial stability be managed in an integrated cross-border market? And what does the ongoing 
financial  crisis  imply  for  the  European  Union’s  financial  integration  project  and  its  financial  stability 
framework? A long-planned but unexpectedly timely conference on these topics was held in Frankfurt on 
September 26, in a joint organization by the IMF and the Center for Financial Studies. 
The  aim  of  the  conference  was  to  provide  a  forum  at 
which policymakers, supervisors, market participants, and 
academics could carry forward the debate on the European 
Union’s (EU) cross-border financial stability arrangements. 
In  the  midst  of  a  global  financial  crisis—the  news  of 
the closure of Washington Mutual greeted the conference 
participants that morning in Frankfurt – this until-recently-
obscure topic had suddenly become very tangible. Indeed, 
recent developments had provided a plethora of interesting 
material to spice up the discussions. Holding a conference 
on financial stability in the midst of a financial crisis also 
comes  with  a  drawback,  though,  in  the  form  of  several 
high-profile last-minute cancellations. Still, the conference 
brought together an impressive array of experts. In various 
ways, the discussions foreshadowed what was about to happen 
in Europe’s financial system.
In  his  introductory  remarks,  Alessandro  Leipold 
(International Monetary Fund) called for a more integrated 
financial stability framework that delivers joint responsibility 
and accountability, better preparedness for cross-border bank 
failures, and more rapid progress toward these objectives. 
Pointing out that Europe is not immune to financial stress 
and  bank  failures,  as  illustrated  too  well  by  the  ongoing 
crisis,  Leipold  emphasized  that  Europe  must  be  better 
prepared to deal with bank failures. He noted that the IMF 
staff  has  long  taken  the  view  that  financial  integration  is 
crucial  to  the  EU’s  growth  prospects,  and  that  achieving 
and safeguarding financial integration requires some form of 
integrated financial stability framework. 
Charles Goodhart (London School of Economics) argued 
that  when  trying  to  come  up  with  a  financial  stability 
framework,  it  is  important  to  “follow  the  money.”  He 
emphasized that it is the ministry of finance that ultimately 
has to decide whether to bail out a bank. He warned quite 
presciently  that  the  need  for  large  scale  solvency  support 
created  by  the  ongoing  crisis  could  result  in  increased 
national control over financial systems, which would set back 
financial integration. Thus, the crisis risked exposing financial 
stability as a key faultline between the euro area’s centralized 
•   The ongoing crisis demonstrates that Europe must be 
better prepared to deal with bank failures.
•   A new financial stability architecture for the EU should 
be based on joint responsibility and accountability. 
•   An inadvertedly timely IMF-CFS conference in Frankfurt 
discussed these issues.
monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy. To counter 
this risk, he argued for limited fiscal federalization for the 
euro area, and eventually for the whole EU.
One  of  the  conference  themes  was  the  role  of  regulation 
and  supervision  in  achieving  the  integration  of  financial 
systems that are rooted in very different legal and regulatory 
systems. Reviewing progress in creating a regulatory level-
playing  field  in  Europe,  Johnny  Åkerholm  (Nordic 
Investment Bank and Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group) 
characterized the process as “going in the right direction, 
but painfully slowly.” He called on politicians to agree on an 
ambitious vision similar to the one that resulted in Monetary 
Union. He suggested modeling the prudential architecture 
on the Eurosystem’s “hub-and-spokes” setup, thus retaining 
proximity  between  supervisors  and  financial  institutions 
at the national level while establishing a level playing field 
and  streamlining  the  oversight  of  cross-border  groups. 
Sergio Lugaresi (Unicredit) argued for the introduction 
of a specific corporate statute adapted to the needs of cross-
border banking groups.
A closely related conference theme was crisis prevention, 
more specifically the monitoring and management of cross-
border risks in the single financial market. Thomas Steffen 
(Committee  of  European  Insurance  and  Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors and BaFin) noted that crisis prevention 
is an ambitious target that has received substantial political 
and institutional attention in recent months, including by 
the EU Council. Arnoud Vossen (Committee of European 
Banking  Supervisors)  elaborated  on  this  theme,  noting 
that the so-called Level 3 Committees have become more 
active in coordinating the work of the national supervisory 
agencies.  David  Mayes  (Bank  of  Finland)  pointed  out 
that  despite  these  efforts,  there  is  still  too  much  scope 
for  national  supervisory  discretion.  He  called  for  a  more 
rules-based  system  of  prompt  corrective  action,  which 
could give authorities in one country more confidence that 
other country authorities’ would intervene into a troubled 
bank relatively early and take it over before its capital is 
depleted. 
In  light  of  the  ongo-
ing  developments,  there 
was  a  very  lively  discus-
sion  on  handling  failures 
of  cross-border  financial 
institutions  in  the  EU. 
Josef Tošovský (Bank for 
International  Settlements) 
quoted a recent survey car-
ried  out  by  the  Financial 
Stability  Institute,  which 
found that the cross-border 
financial stability framework largely consisted of memoranda 
of  understanding  and  ad-hoc  meetings.  Franklin  Allen 
(University  of  Pennsylvania)  presented  an  analysis  of  the 
recent large bank failures in the United States, noting that 
there are opposing explanations for what happened, leading 
to very different recommendations for handling the failures. 
Dirk Schoenmaker (Dutch Economics Ministry and VU 
University Amsterdam) pointed out that the objective of a 
Charles Goodhart, Jan Krahnen Johnny Åkerholm, Gerd Häusler, Sergio Lugaresi
Arnoud Vossen, Thomas Steffen, David Mayes
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stable and integrated finan-
cial system in the European 
Union is inconsistent with 
national  financial  stability 
policies. He argued that the 
stability of the EU financial 
system could not be assured 
if a financial crisis, involv-
ing  one  or  more  of  the 
emerging  pan-European 
banks, were to happen.
The  concluding  policy 
panel,  chaired  by 
Mr.  Jaime  Caruana 
(International  Monetary 
Fund), focused on concrete 
steps  to  strengthen 
Europe‘s financial stability 
framework.  The  views 
expressed by the panelists 
provided  a  revealing 
illustration  of  the  state 
of  the  debate  and  the 
remaining  sensitivities.  Recurring  themes  were  calls  for 
greater  centralization  of  financial  supervision  (although 
opinions differed on the form this should take and on ECB 
involvement), better bank resolution frameworks, enhanced 
coordination between macro and micro prudential policies 
(i.e.,  between  central  banks  and  supervisors),  a  single 
rules book, and expeditious progress toward an improved 
regulatory framework that addresses the weaknesses exposed 
by the financial crisis.
Lorenzo  Bini  Smaghi  (European  Central  Bank)  and 
Pervenche Berès (European Parliament) both called for 
far-reaching reforms of the financial system, even though 
their emphasis was different: Mr. Bini Smaghi emphasized 
the role of conflicts of interest in the financial system; Ms. 
Berès  stressed  the  need  for  more  stringent  regulation  of 
certain financial market activities. In a reaction from the 
audience,  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  (Goethe  University  and 
CFS) argued that the causes of the problems must be well 
understood  before  major  new  regulations  are  introduced. 
Views also differed on the degree of supervisory integration 
that Europe needs: Jonas Niemeyer (Sveriges Riksbank) 
called  for  much  more  integration,  including  possibly  the 
creation  of  a  single  European  supervisory  agency,  while 
Zdenek  Tuma  (Czech  National  Bank)  emphasized  the 
challenges  faced  by  host  country  authorities,  and  called 
for  a  return  to  greater  host  country  control.  Danielle 
Nouy  (Commission  Bancaire)  reviewed  the  experience 
with colleges of supervisors, and suggested to build on that 
experience.
Even though views differed 
on  specifics,  there  was  a 
broad  consensus  that  the 
EU  countries  individually 
and  Europe  as  a  whole 
need to be better prepared 
to  prevent,  manage,  and 
resolve  bank  failures. 
There was also widespread 
recognition of the fact that 
the current crisis will lead 
to profound debate on the 
foundations  of  modern  finance.  Likewise,  policymakers 
ought  to  turn  this  crisis  into  an  opportunity  to  have  an 
open, unconstrained debate about the EU’s financial stability 
arrangements – a debate freed from long-standing national 
red lines and infused with a greater sense of multilateralism 
and urgency, and thus leading to policy action. The largely 
uncoordinated response of European policymakers in the days 
that followed the conference underscored the importance of 
these conclusions.
Elena Carletti (CFS),
Martin Cihák, and Wim Fonteyne (both IMF)
Dirk Schoenmaker
→   For more details, including a list of 
the speakers and the relevant back-
ground materials, see:
        http://www.ifk-cfs.de/index.php?id=1360.
Jaime Caruana
Danielle Nouy
ECB-CFS Conference 
“Household Finances and Consumption”
4-5 September 2008 
Frankfurt am Main
Organizers: Luigi Guiso (EUI), Michael Haliassos (Goethe University and CFS), 
Lucrezia Reichlin (ECB), Peter Mooslechner (Austrian National Bank)
On  the  4th  and  5th  of  September  2008,  the  ECB  and  the  CFS  Research  Program  on  Household  Wealth 
Management jointly organized a conference on household finances and consumption, which took place at 
Campus Westend of Goethe University. The conference’s main purpose was to present recent research on 
household finance and to discuss prospects for creating a “Euro Zone Survey of Household Finances and 
Consumption”. Preparatory work for the creation and launch of such a survey has lasted almost three years, 
with Luigi Guiso (EUI), Michael Haliassos (Goethe University and CFS) and Arthur Kennickell (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) acting as academic consultants. Researchers and practitioners from 
the U.K., the United States and various European countries used the opportunity provided by the conference 
to present recent research, put this project into perspective, and to discuss the usefulness of such surveys in 
academic research and policy design. 
The  first  day  of  the 
conference was introduced 
by  Orazio  Attanasio’s 
(University College London 
and  Institute  for  Fiscal 
Studies) plenary talk, which 
addressed  the  question 
whether or not house price 
growth drives consumption 
growth in the U.K. Given 
their  strong  association, 
is  this  due  to  wealth  and 
collateral  effects  on  consumption  or  does  this  arise  from 
common factors, such as expectations, affecting both house 
prices and consumption growth? The speaker emphasized the 
need for micro level data for differentiating between these two 
possibilities. Wealth, house prices, and income expectations 
are likely to have different effects on different age groups, with 
older people responding more to capital gains and younger 
people responding more to income expectations.
The  second  plenary  talk  was  held  by  Deborah  Lucas 
(Northwestern  University).  She  argued  that  the  widely 
taught representative agent approach misses the household 
heterogeneity  that  is  crucial  to  understanding  important 
issues  in  household  finance.  By  mentioning  a  number  of 
surveys  which  are  conducted  in  the  U.S.,  including  the 
Survey  of  Consumer  Finances  and  the  Panel  Study  of 
Income  Dynamics,  she, 
too,  placed  emphasis 
on  having  such  a  survey 
within  Europe.  Her  talk 
focused on questions such 
as  how  diversified  are 
stock  holders,  and  how 
important are “mistakes”, 
such as non-participation, 
limited  diversification, 
and the like? All of these 
explicitly call for modeling 
frameworks that allow for heterogeneity across individuals. 
The  two  plenary  talks  were  followed  by  a  speech  from 
Vítor  Constâncio,  Governor  of  the  Banco  de  Portugal. 
He  highlighted  the  need  for  micro  level  data  from  a 
central banking perspective. Monetary policy makers need 
survey data so as to be able to assess the determinants of 
consumption and saving, to understand wealth effects and, 
importantly, to assess the determinants and consequences 
of  indebtedness.  After  introducing  the  main  features  and 
characteristics  of  the  Portuguese  survey  on  household 
wealth, Governor Constâncio pointed out the potential that 
a Euro Zone Survey would have – it would allow for both 
country specific as well as for an aggregate examination. He 
also said it should contain a panel structure so as to allow for 
the analysis of lifecycle and cohort effects. 
Orazio Attanasio Deborah Lucas16 17
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The  next  session  was 
directed  more  concretely 
towards  the  household 
finances  and  consumption 
project. Caroline Willeke 
and  Michael  Ehrmann 
(both  European  Central 
Bank  staff)  presented 
the  project  and  were 
then  followed  by  a  panel 
discussion led by Manuel 
Arellano  (Centro  De 
Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros), Christopher Carroll 
(Johns Hopkins University), and Tullio Jappelli (University 
of Naples and Center for Studies in Economics and Finance). 
Manuel Arellano opened the discussion by putting the project 
into perspective. According to Arellano, household survey data 
on income, wealth, and consumption are an essential input for 
evidence-based policy. On top of this, information technologies 
and increasing computing power create new opportunities for 
the analysis of large micro datasets. Moreover, such datasets 
are not only used within academia but also within central 
banks. The floor was then given to Christopher Carroll, who 
made  suggestions  on  how 
to proceed with the survey. 
Among  other  things,  he 
suggested creating a public 
website  where  people  can 
post programs, results, and 
the like, and which would 
serve as a forum where they 
can  discuss  all  questions 
related to the survey and its 
use  in  empirical  research. 
Secondly, he emphasized the 
need for some standardized 
structure of the survey for different countries so as to make 
results as comparable as possible. Tullio Jappelli completed 
the discussion and the first day of the conference by reviewing 
the  advantages  of  having  internationally  comparable  data 
available. Since there is a huge variety of European institutions 
and policies, their impact can certainly only be understood 
if one compares these across time and countries. As regards 
data collection, Jappelli highlighted both the importance of 
repeated cross-sections and panel data structures which would 
allow one to study age and cohort effects, portfolio transitions, 
and how people respond to shocks. Also, data on subjective 
probabilities have been promising with respect to explaining 
people’s behavior, as they can help in analyzing, inter alia, 
social  security  expectations,  investment  expectations,  and 
survival probabilities. 
Session  One  on  the 
second  day  of  the  confe-
rence,  titled  “Consumer 
Bankruptcy  and  Default: 
The  Role  of  Individual 
Social  Capital  Formation 
Characteristics”, was led by 
Sumit  Agarwal  (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago). 
He presented a paper writ-
ten jointly with Souphala 
Chomsisengphet  (U.S. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) and Chunlin Liu 
(University of Nevada-Reno). The purpose of their study is 
to assess empirically the role of individual social capital forma-
tion characteristics on personal bankruptcy and default out-
comes in the consumer credit market. Among other things, 
they find that default risk rises and falls over the lifecycle, 
while borrowers who own a home and are married have a 
lower risk of default/bankruptcy. The discussant was Daniel 
Dorn (LeBow College of Business, Drexel University).
The  second  paper  was  titled  “Household  External  Finance 
and  Consumption”  and  is  a  joint  work  by  Paolo  Surico, 
Neil  Meads  (both  Bank  of  England  staff),  and  Timothy 
Besley (Bank of England and London School of Economics). 
This paper uses mortgage data to construct a measure of the 
terms on which households have access to external finance, 
and relates this to consumption at both the aggregate and 
cohort levels. They adduce evidence that the terms of access 
to external finance matter more for consumption by young 
cohorts in U.K. data. Their results are solid with respect to a 
wide variety of specifications.
The first paper in the following session, by Marjorie Flavin 
(UC San Diego) and Takashi Yamashita (Reed College), 
was titled “Owner-Occupied Housing: Life-cycle Implications 
for the Household Portfolio”. The authors consider the effect 
of housing in a portfolio allocation problem by conditioning 
on the current holding of housing. In order to determine the 
optimal holding of financial assets they use the mean-variance 
framework.  The  authors  consider  the  implications  of  the 
model for the composition of the portfolio over the lifecycle, 
the main finding being that while collateral and non-negativity 
constraints  are  present,  the  optimal  portfolio  will  depend 
both on the degree of household risk aversion and the ratio of 
house value to net wealth. They conclude by examining the 
lifecycle patterns in portfolio data provided by the Survey of 
Consumer Finances.
The  second  talk  in  this 
session was based on joint 
work  by  Annamaria 
Lusardi  (Dartmouth 
College) and Peter Tufano 
(Harvard Business School), 
titled  “Debt  Literacy, 
Financial  Experience  and 
Over-Indebtedness”.  In 
their paper, a new dataset, 
based on a U.S. survey from 
November 2007, is used to 
analyze the financial experience of survey respondents, their 
debt literacy, and their own judgments about the level of their 
indebtedness. Overall, the authors find that debt literacy is 
low,  especially  among  certain  demographic  groups.  They 
also find a clear relationship between debt literacy and both 
debt loads and financial experience. The results suggest that 
individuals who are less literate report that their debt loads 
are excessive and that they are unable to judge their debt 
position.
The  first  study  of  the  third  session,  titled  “Diversification 
and its Discontents: Idiosyncratic and Entrepreneurial Risk 
in the Quest for Social Status”, was presented by Nikolai 
Roussanov  (University  of  Pennsylvania).  Roussanov  uses 
a  portfolio  choice  model  that  incorporates  preference  for 
social status in order to explain a number of stylized facts 
about  the  heterogeneous  nature  of  asset  holdings  among 
U.S. households. Concern about social status is introduced 
by incorporating a household’s wealth relative to aggregate 
wealth in the economy directly into the utility function. His 
model has been calibrated such that it matches the empirical 
level of risky asset holdings.
The second paper of this session was then presented by Oded 
Stark (University of Bonn). He presented a paper written 
jointly with Donald Cox (Boston College), titled “Bequests, 
Inheritances,  and  Family  Traditions”.  The  purpose  of  this 
study is to consider whether family traditions have an impact 
upon bequest behavior, i.e. to question whether an individual 
who  receives  an  inheritance  is  then  more  likely  to  give  a 
bequest to his or her children. The authors use data from the 
U.S. Health and Retirement Survey, which is one of the few 
such surveys providing data both on bequests and inheritances. 
The main finding of their study is that intended bequests and 
inheritances  are  indeed  positively  and  significantly  related, 
importantly so after controlling for household characteristics 
such as household net worth.
The  fourth  and  final  session  of  the  day  started  with  a 
focus  on  the  paper  “House  Prices  and  Consumption:  A 
Micro  Study”  written  by  Mette  Gortz  (AKF,  Danish 
Institute of Governmental Research), Martin Browning 
(Oxford University), and Soren Leth-Petersen (University 
of  Copenhagen).  The  paper  studies  the  close  relationship 
between house prices and consumption, and stresses that no 
consensus has been found on the causes of an apparent link 
between these two factors. Despite a number of alternative 
explanations in the literature, these authors favor the idea 
that  the  observed  correlation  may  be  due  to  “common 
causality”, in that changing house prices may be correlated 
with  expectations  of  general  productivity  changes  in  the 
economy. In their study, they focus on a panel data set that is 
available for Denmark, comprising information on individual 
house ownership, income, and wealth for about 10 percent of 
the population here.
The  second  paper  within  the  fourth  session,  titled  “The 
Response of Household’s Consumption and Balance Sheets 
to the Risk of Losing the Job: Evidence from Firing Costs”, 
is  a  joint  work  by  Ernesto  Villanueva  and  Christina 
Barcelò (both Banco de España staff). Their study focuses 
on the question whether and, if so, to what extent, individuals 
exposed to the risk of losing their job postpone consumption 
plans and thereby increase their savings. Firing costs are taken 
as a potential predictor of transition into unemployment and 
are found to serve this purpose very well. The link between 
the probability of household members losing their job and the 
wealth and consumption of their households is examined using 
a survey of wealth and consumption.
The  second  to  last  presentation  was  devoted  to  “Financial 
Literacy,  Retirement  Planning  and  Household  Wealth”  by 
Maarten van Rooij (De Nederlandsche Bank), Rob Alessie 
(Utrecht School of Economics), and Annamaria Lusardi 
(Dartmouth  College).  Their  purpose  is  to  investigate  the 
relationship between financial sophistication and household 
net worth using survey data from the Dutch DNB household 
survey. According to their findings, this relationship is both 
statistically  and  economically  significant.  In  addition,  they 
indicate two channels through which a correlation emerges. 
Firstly,  individuals  and  households  may  be  more  likely  to 
invest  in  the  stock  market  if  they  have  some  knowledge 
Michael Ehrmann
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about financial instruments. Secondly, financial sophistication 
may  increase  households’  awareness  of  the  importance  of 
retirement planning and may, in this regard, have an impact 
on their behavior.
The conference was subsequently closed by the presentation 
of a paper by Frederic Lambert (Banque de France) and 
Matteo Pignatti (New York University), namely “Saving 
Behavior Over the Lifecycle Does Not Differ Across Countries. 
Portfolio Choices Do”. This paper compares consumption and 
savings profiles in Italy and the U.S. over the lifecycle using 
detailed micro data for both countries. The authors highlight 
that savings profiles are very much alike, while differences are 
found when looking at wealth-age-profiles, first and foremost 
when  considering  the  portfolio  composition  of  households 
between housing and financial assets. Household portfolios in 
general appear to be more leveraged at the beginning of the 
lifecycle in the U.S. than in Italy. 
By and large, the ECB-CFS Conference on the Household 
Finances  and  Consumption  Network  provided  a  great 
opportunity for researchers and practitioners in the field of 
household finance as well as planners of the European survey 
of household finances to meet and discuss recent stimulating 
research. It also enabled them to consider how this survey 
could provide an important input into such research in the 
future. The crucial importance of having a panel dimension 
within  the  survey  was  emphasized,  as  this  would  allow 
changes in portfolios to be tracked over time and age and 
cohort, and also enable time effects to be separated. In Chris 
Carroll’s words, such a feature would give the Euro Zone 
Survey of Household Finances and Consumption “a chance to 
beat the Americans!”
Marco Buchmann (Goethe University Frankfurt)
International Research Forum on Monetary Policy
26-27 June 2008 
hosted by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt
The fifth conference of the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy took place in Frankfurt on the 
26th and 27th of June 2008, and was hosted by the European Central Bank. This year’s conference was organized 
by Matthew Canzoneri (CGES), Dale Henderson (FRB), Lucrezia Reichlin (ECB), and Volker Wieland (Goethe 
University  Frankfurt  and  CFS).  As  in  previous  years,  the  audience  consisted  of  researchers  from  leading 
universities, international organizations, and central banks, but also included financial market observers from 
private sector firms and representatives of the financial press.
After welcoming the speakers and the 
audience, Lucrezia Reichlin opened 
the  conference  with  a  session  on 
“Financial Markets, Financial Crises and 
the Transmission of Monetary Policy”. 
In  the  first  research  contribution, 
Markus  Brunnermeier  (Princeton 
University)  analyzed  the  2007-2008 
liquidity and credit crunch. He identified 
four  amplification  mechanisms  to 
explain why the mortgage crisis caused 
such  large  dislocations  and  turmoil 
in  the  financial  markets:  liquidity 
spirals that arise from deterioration in 
borrowers’  balance  sheets;  hoarding 
and interest rate surges in the interbank 
market  driven  by  uncertainty  about 
future funding needs; runs on financial 
institutions  when  financiers  try  to 
preempt each other; and network and 
gridlock risk when financial institutions 
are lenders and borrowers at the same 
time.  While  the  losses  in  subprime 
mortgages appeared large at first, the 
author emphasized that the 2007-2008 
crisis was surprisingly “classical”. The 
new element, however, was the extent 
of  securitization  which  increased  the 
exposure  to  counterparty  risk  while 
also  creating  additional  difficulties 
in  valuing  structured  products.  As 
a  consequence,  the  author  called 
for  the  regulatory  framework  to  be 
rethought.
Robert King (Boston University and 
NBER)  and  Julia  Thomas  (Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  Philadelphia  and 
NBER)  presented  a  model  economy 
nesting  two  models,  a  standard  New 
Keynesian setting and a setting where 
small  transactions  costs  engender  an 
evolving  distribution  of  money  across 
households. In contrast to the standard 
New  Keynesian  setting,  portfolio 
adjustment  costs  lead  to  a  breakdown 
of  the  Keynesian  dichotomy  such 
that  aggregate  demand  can  no  longer 
be  determined  without  reference  to 
monetary  variables.  In  examining  the 
nature of dynamic responses arising in 
their  setting,  the  authors  found  that 
the model has also desirable empirical 
properties.
The importance of foreign factors for 
domestic inflation was the topic of the 
paper by Luca Guerreri, Christopher 
Gust  and  David  López-Salido  (all 
Federal  Reserve  Board).  In  the  spirit 
of Dornbusch and Fischer (1985), the 
authors  developed  and  estimated  an 
open-economy New Keynesian Phillips 
curve  in  which  variations  in  desired 
markups  of  domestic  producers  arise 
in response to changes in competitive 
pressure from abroad. Their main result 
was  that  foreign  competition  plays 
an  important  role  in  accounting  for 
inflation dynamics: reducing the desired 
markups of domestic producers, foreign 
competition  lowered  domestic  goods 
inflation in the U.S. in the 2000-2006 
period  by  about  1  percentage  point. 
The authors also found that movements 
in  relative  import  prices  associated 
with  changes  in  foreign  competition 
accounted  for  over  one-third  of  the 
volatility of goods price inflation over 
the 1983-2006 sample period. Finally, 
the  results  also  provided  evidence  in 
favor of demand curves which lead to 
endogenous variations in markups.
In  his  luncheon  speech  titled  “Global 
Economic Integration and Decoupling”, 
Donald Kohn (FRB) warned against 
taking the current slowdown in the U.S. 
as  indicative  of  apparent  divergences 
in economic performance between the 
major  industrial  countries.  Although 
the  latest  downturn  was  not  felt  as 
uniformly  in  the  global  economy  as 
previous  ones,  these  divergences  do 
not  constitute  breaks  from  historical 
benchmarks but rather represent distinct 
shocks  hitting  the  global  economy. 
As  construction  utilizes  mainly  local 
inputs and results in output that is not 
traded internationally, its spillovers on 
the real side of foreign economies are 
limited. Hence, although the financial 
turmoil  triggered  by  problems  in  the 
U.S.  housing  sector  has  been  more 
international  in  scope,  its  effects  on 
the real side of foreign economies have 
been  limited  so  far.  Simultaneously, 
improved  economic  and  financial 
policies  have  made  emerging  market 
economies more flexible and less subject 
to internal and external shocks so that 
assets from these financial markets were 
not sold off after the financial turmoil 
in  the  U.S.  Thus,  greater  economic 
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and financial integration can indeed be 
reconciled with less synchronization of 
developments across countries.
After the lunch break, Fabio Milani 
(University  of  California,  Irvine) 
presented  a  DSGE  model  in  which 
agents’  learning  speed  (their  gain 
coefficient) is endogenous, responding 
to previous forecast errors. A changing 
gain  coefficient  would  endogenously 
generate time-varying macroeconomic 
volatility.  Taking  the  model  to  the 
data,  the  author’s  estimation  results 
confirmed the evidence of large changes 
in  the  gain  over  the  post-war  U.S. 
sample.  These  changes  could  imply 
important changes in macroeconomic 
volatility  roughly  matching  the 
magnitude  of  the  Great  Moderation. 
The author concluded that neglecting 
these learning dynamics would lead to 
an overestimation of the importance of 
changes in the volatility of exogenous 
shocks.
Next,  Gianni  Amisano  and  Oreste 
Tristani  (both  ECB)  investigated 
empirically  the  interaction  between 
shifts  in  trend  productivity  growth, 
policy interest rates and the natural rate 
in a small New Keynesian model of the 
euro area. The authors found that shifts 
in  trend  productivity  could  explain  a 
sizable  portion  of  observed  euro-area 
inflation over the 1980s and 1990s. In 
contrast  to  what  was  usually  found  in 
DSGE  models,  the  authors’  estimates 
of the natural rate were much smaller, 
suggesting  that  monetary  policy  had 
mostly  behaved  consistently  with  the 
objective  of  eliminating  all  sources  of 
inflationary pressure from the economy.
The last paper on the first conference 
day  by  Carlos  Thomas  (Bank  of 
Spain) and Francesco Zanetti (Bank 
of  England)  dealt  with  the  effect  of 
labor-market  reform  on  inflation 
volatility. Their analysis was based on a 
New Keynesian model with search and 
matching frictions. The model suggests 
that changes in unemployment benefits 
or  firing  costs  affect  inflation  through 
their  effect  on  real  marginal  costs. 
However, when taking the model to the 
data, the authors found that changes in 
unemployment  benefits  or  firing  costs 
had very small effects on the volatility 
of inflation.
In his dinner speech, Lucas Papademos 
(ECB)  addressed  the  audience  with  a 
central banker’s perspective on financial 
market excesses and corrections. After 
discussing the underlying causes of the 
financial turmoil, he turned to the role 
of central bank policies and tasks in both 
preventing financial market imbalances 
as well as mitigating the consequences 
of  a  sharp  correction  in  the  financial 
system.  While  the  ECB  has  alleviated 
financial  stability  risks  through  the 
effective  management  of  liquidity  in 
interbank  money  markets  in  response 
to the financial market turbulence, he 
highlighted that there is also scope for 
the central bank to prevent asset price 
bubbles.  For  example,  central  banks 
can minimize the likelihood of financial 
turmoil by enhancing their monitoring 
of  financial  stability,  by  further 
developing the pertinent methodologies 
and  models  and  by  improving  the 
availability  of  relevant  data.  In  view 
of  the  policy  issues  arising  from  the 
latest  financial  market  turbulence,  he 
emphasized  the  importance  of  further 
research on financial market imbalances 
and appropriate policy responses in an 
environment such as “The International 
Research Forum on Monetary Policy”. 
The conference continued with Maria 
Demertzis  (De  Nederlandsche  Bank 
and  University  of  Amsterdam)  and 
Nicola Viegi (University of Cape Town 
and  ERSA)  who  interpreted  inflation 
targeting as a means for communication 
rather than a monetary policy strategy 
and  modeled  monetary  policy  as  an 
information  game  between  the  bank 
and  private  agents.  The  combination 
of  communicating  the  target  and  a 
tolerance  band  around  it  provides  a 
clear framework with which to evaluate 
monetary policy outcomes. As a result, 
a  successful  central  bank  builds  up 
credibility and a credible central bank 
is in a better position to be successful in 
later periods. The authors showed how 
and  when  inflation  targeting  exploits 
this  self-reinforcing  loop  to  help  the 
central bank to endure large and long-
lasting  shocks.  A  trade-off  emerges 
when choosing the bandwidth around 
the  target:  too  narrow  bands  provide 
a focal point but reduce the likelihood 
to be successful. Too wide bands more 
easily lead to success but fail to deliver 
a clear focal point.
Josephine  Smith  and  John  Taylor 
(both Stanford University) instead took 
a closer look at how shifts in the central 
bank’s  policy  rule  cause  shifts  in  the 
term structure of interest rates. They 
derived  a  new  representation  of  the 
term  structure  in  which  long-term 
interest  rates  are  related  to  inflation 
and  output,  and  the  term  structure 
is  simply  a  series  of  implied  policy 
rules for long-term interest rules with 
response coefficients measuring the size 
of the interest rate reaction. Using this 
they  derived  analytically  an  equation 
relating the response coefficients in the 
implied long-term interest rate rules to 
response coefficients of the short-term 
interest rate rule of the central bank. 
The main result was that a secular shift 
in the monetary policy rule in the mid-
1980s  in  the  U.S.  explains  the  large 
shift in the term structure. The model 
also helps to explain the behavior of the 
longer-term  interest  rates  during  the 
period 2003-2005.
How  much  inflation  is  necessary 
to  grease  the  wheels?  This  was  the 
question  that  Jinill  Kim  (Federal 
Donald L. Kohn
→   The complete conference program including papers 
and speeches can be found at:  http://www.ifk-cfs.de/?id=1398
Reserve Board) and Francisco Ruge-
Murcia  (University  of  Montréal) 
analyzed.  Taking  up  the  proposition 
by  Tobin  that  inflation  “greases  the 
wheels”  of  the  labor  market,  the 
authors employed a DSGE model with 
asymmetric wage adjustment costs. The 
authors’ econometric results suggested 
that  nominal  wages  are  downwardly 
rigid  and  that  the  optimal  level  of 
grease inflation for the U.S. is about 1.2 
percentage points per year. This optimal 
level  of  grease  inflation  naturally 
depends on the specified model.
The  lunch  break  was  followed  by 
David  Arseneau  (Federal  Reserve 
Board) and Sanjay Chugh (University 
of  Maryland)  who  re-examined  the 
conventional  wisdom  regarding 
labor  tax-smoothing  in  the  presence 
of  frictional  labor  markets.  In  these 
markets,  if  wages  are  determined  by 
ex-post Nash bargaining, tax smoothing 
is  not  optimal.  If  instead  wages  are 
determined  before  workers  and  firms 
meet and search is directed by wages 
while  labor  markets  are  governed  by 
competitive  search  equilibrium,  the 
optimality of tax smoothing is restored. 
As a consequence, whether or not tax 
smoothing is as important as standard 
theory  suggests  critically  depends  on 
the wage-formation process. One has to 
accept a Walrasian or competitive view 
of wage determination in order to accept 
the prescription of tax smoothing.
Federico Ravenna and Carl Walsh 
(both  University  of  California,  Santa 
Cruz)  concluded  the  conference  with 
their paper on the welfare consequences 
of monetary policy and the role of the 
labor market. Exploring the nature of 
distortions in sticky-price labor friction 
models,  the  authors  found  that  the 
monetary  authority  faces  a  trade-off 
between  stabilizing  the  retail  price 
markup as a policy goal in its own right 
or  moving  the  markup  to  mimic  the 
cyclical tax policy that would lead to 
efficient  vacancy  posting.  Deviations 
from price stability are optimal if wages 
are  rigid  around  an  inefficient  level. 
In  these  cases,  the  welfare  gains  of 
deviating from price stability are larger 
in economies with more volatile labor 
market flows such as the U.S. Higher 
firing and hiring costs as in the EU make 
price stability a closer approximation to 
the optimal policy.
Julia Le Blanc (CFS)
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The Industrial Organization of Securities Markets: 
Competition, Liquidity and Network Externalities
13-14 June 2008 
Frankfurt am Main
The securities markets landscape has been changing quite significantly over the last years, through the increase 
of competition, the advancement of technology and the restructuring of the industry. This process depends 
heavily on the characteristics of the industry within the individual layers of the entire value chain (trading, 
clearing and settlement), be it e.g. liquidity effects and network externalities. The industrial organization of 
securities markets will keep on evolving, as the value chain will be impacted by regulatory changes. In the 
European Union initiatives such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) or the clearing 
and settlement industry‘s Code of Conduct, and in the U.S. the Regulation NMS are already challenging the 
industry of securities markets. The aim of the conference was to shed light on all aspects of the industrial 
organization of securities markets. The issues addressed at the conference covered the entire value chain in the 
exchange business, including both cash and derivatives trading, as well as the post-trade area that is essential 
for an effective and efficient functioning of an organized market. 
The  conference  was  co-organized  by 
Deutsche Börse AG, the E-Finance Lab 
and  the  Center  for  Financial  Studies 
and held on the premises of Deutsche 
Börse  AG  on  June  13  and  14,  2008. 
The audience was a stimulating mix of 
academics and practitioners. 
The  welcome  address  was  delivered 
by  Reto  Francioni,  the  CEO  of 
Deutsche  Börse  AG.  He  stressed  that 
the  conference  deals  with  issues  that 
are highly pertinent to today’s exchange 
industry and noted that a listed company 
like Deutsche Börse AG in today’s world 
of globalized competition quite simply 
cannot  afford  to  ignore  new  ideas  in 
technology,  product  development 
and  market  design.  Francioni  then 
commented on the business strategy of 
Deutsche  Börse  AG.  He  stressed  the 
advantages  of  integrating  all  elements 
of  the  value  chain  -  trading,  clearing 
and settlement. The integrated model, 
in his view, creates synergies, provides 
economies  of  scale  and  increases  the 
operational  efficiency  of  the  market. 
The  integrated  business  model  of 
Deutsche  Börse  AG  is  the  basis  for 
growth  along  three  dimensions:  new 
products, an expansion of the customer 
base, and the penetration of markets in 
new  regions.  Francioni  concluded  by 
noting  that  the  legitimacy  of  markets 
critically depends on their integrity, on 
the transparency they offer, and on their 
allocative efficiency – in other words: 
on  their  ability  to  maximize  overall 
welfare. 
The first presentation by Michel Robe 
(U.S. CFTC and American University) 
dealt  with  recent  changes  in  the 
governance structure of exchanges. In the 
last decade many exchanges have been 
converted  from  mutual  not-for-profit 
organizations  into  profit-maximizing 
firms.  An  important  question  in  this 
context  is  whether  profit-maximizing 
exchanges have sufficient incentives to 
enforce investor-protecting regulation. 
Based  on  a  formal  theoretical  model 
Michel Robe concluded that – in contrast 
to oft-stated concerns – a shareholder-
value  maximizing  exchange  in  many 
circumstances has stronger incentives to 
enforce regulation.
Albert  Menkveld  (VU  University 
Amsterdam)  analyzed  the  increasingly 
important  phenomenon  of  algorithmic 
trading. Based on an empirical analysis 
of data from the New York Stock Ex-
change he finds that algorithmic trading 
causes an increase in liquidity. Markus 
Gsell  (Goethe  University  Frankfurt) 
looked  at  algorithmic  trading  from  a 
very  different  angle.  He  performed 
simulations in order to assess the impact 
of  algorithmic  trading.  The  results 
indicate that large volumes executed by 
the algorithmic trader have an increasing 
impact on market prices. On the other 
hand, lower latency (i.e., a higher speed 
of execution) appears to lower market 
volatility.
Investors  may  have  different  access  to 
market information. For example, retail 
investors  may  observe  market  prices 
and best bid and ask quotes only with a 
delay. Giovanni Cespa (Queen Mary 
University of London, CSEF-Università 
di  Salerno  and  CEPR)  presented 
a  rational  expectations  model  which 
analyzes  the  consequences  of  these 
informational  asymmetries.  Insiders 
(those receiving real-time information) 
get  higher  expected  utility.  Average 
welfare,  however,  is  maximized  when 
only a fraction of investors have access 
to real-time information. A market for 
information can implement the optimal 
fraction of insiders.
Standard models of trading assume that 
buyers  and  sellers  are  equally  patient. 
This  does  not  have  to  be  the  case, 
however. In a panic, for example, sellers 
are  likely  to  be  very  impatient  while 
buyers  may  be  patient.  Mark  Van 
Achter (University of Bonn) presented 
a  theoretical  model  that  describes 
the  interaction  between  traders  with 
differing  degrees  of  patience.  The 
model yields important insights on order 
submission strategies and the dynamics 
of prices and quotes.
Many  electronic  limit  order  markets 
allow traders to submit hidden orders, 
also  called  iceberg  orders.  Only  a 
fraction  of  the  true  size  of  a  hidden 
order is displayed on the trading screens. 
Patrik Sandas (University of Virginia 
and  CEPR)  presented  a  paper  which 
analyzes the impact of the existence of 
hidden  orders  on  liquidity.  Based  on 
an analysis of Xetra data he concluded 
that  the  presence  of  hidden  liquidity 
is  associated  with  greater  liquidity 
and  higher  trading  volume.  He  also 
presented evidence consistent with the 
existence  of  hidden  orders  enhancing 
the welfare of all market participants.
Robert  Schwartz  (Baruch  College) 
empirically  analyzed  the  impact  the 
2004 introduction of Nasdaq’s opening 
and  closing  call  auctions  has  had  on 
market quality. He reports that volatility 
follows  a  U-shaped  intra-day  pattern 
that  is  largely  driven  by  just  three 
minutes (the two that follow the open, 
and  the  one  that  precedes  the  close). 
Generally,  both  calls  have  reduced 
volatility and improved the efficiency of 
price discovery.
In  his  presentation  Craig  Pirrong 
(University of Houston) dealt with the 
issue  of  clearing  and  settlement.  The 
execution,  clearing,  and  settlement 
of  transactions  are  all  subject  to  eco-
nomies of scale and scope, which may 
make  them  natural  monopolies.  He 
argued  that  the  integration  of  these 
three functions improves efficiency by 
economizing  on  transaction  costs.  In 
his view, transaction cost considerations 
rather than market power considerations 
should be the primary focus of analysis.
Many regulated markets (and derivatives 
exchanges in particular) employ a central 
counterparty.  Cyril  Monnet  (FRB 
Philadelphia  and  European  Central 
Bank) presented a model which compares 
user-oriented  and  profit-maximizing 
central counterparties. The two types 
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differ  with  respect  to  the  amount  of 
collateral they demand from members 
and with respect to the trading volume 
they allow. None of the types dominates 
from a welfare perspective.
It  is  a  characteristic  of  many  liquid 
markets that the quoted bid-ask spread 
is often equal to (and bounded by) the 
minimum tick size (e.g. one cent). The 
paper  presented  by  Jonathan  Field 
(Man Investments) empirically analyzes 
four  futures  markets  for  which  this 
is the case. Further, in these markets 
limit orders with the same price limit 
are  executed  on  a  pro-rata  allocation 
base  (rather  than  by  relying  on  time 
precedence).  The  results  indicate  that 
depth  at  the  best  quotes  is  extremely 
high  and  that  order  cancellation  rates 
are  also  very  high.  The  author  than 
presented  a  theoretical  model  which 
explains these stylized facts. The main 
result of the model is that there exists 
an incentive to submit over-sized limit 
orders most of which are cancelled later 
on.
Gunther Wuyts (University of Leuven) 
presented  a  paper  which  analyzes  the 
dynamics of the best bid and ask quotes 
in the Spanish stock market. Based on 
vector  autoregressive  models  he  finds 
that several dimensions of liquidity (e.g., 
spread,  depth,  resiliency)  deteriorate 
after a shock to one of the dimensions. 
This  interdependence  between  the 
dimensions  of  liquidity  results  in 
a  somewhat  less  favorable  picture  of 
liquidity than often found in the extant 
literature.
Recent  empirical  research  has 
concluded that liquidity is an important 
determinant of expected stock returns 
and  that  realized  stock  returns  are 
systematically  related  to  market-wide 
liquidity.  Azi  Ben-Rephael  (Tel 
Aviv  University)  presented  empirical 
evidence  that  both  the  sensitivity  of 
returns  to  liquidity  and  the  liquidity 
premium  have  substantially  decreased 
over the last forty years and have now 
reached a level that is indistinguishable 
from  zero.  A  possible  explanation  for 
this  surprising  finding  is  the  gradual 
introduction and proliferation of index 
funds and exchange traded funds.
Joachim  Grammig  (University  of 
Tübingen)  analyzed  the  process  of 
price  discovery  for  Canadian  stocks 
that  are  cross-listed  in  the  U.S.  The 
standard  methodology  (Hasbrouck‘s 
1995  information  share  approach) 
only yields upper and lower bounds to 
the  contributions  to  price  discovery. 
Increasing  the  data  frequency  lowers 
the spread between the upper and lower 
bounds  but,  at  the  same  time,  may 
lead  to  distorted  estimation  because 
of  microstructure  noise.  The  paper 
introduces  a  new  approach  which 
relies  on  distributional  assumptions. 
It  allows  a  unique  identification  of 
the  contributions  to  price  discovery 
while  controlling  for  microstructure 
noise. The results indicate that previous 
research  has  underestimated  the 
contribution  of  U.S.  markets  for  the 
process of price discovery of Canadian 
cross-listed firms.
The  “riskfree  rate”  (typically  proxied 
by  the  rate  of  return  on  short-term 
government issues) is one of the most 
important variables in finance. Michel 
van  der  Wel  (VU  University  of 
Amsterdam) analyzed empirically how 
the riskfree rate is affected by macro 
announcements.  The  results  indicate 
that  some  of  the  impact  is  reflected 
immediately after the publication of the 
macro announcement but that the full 
impact is only discovered after about 15 
minutes and is only revealed by customer 
order flow. Additional analyses confirm 
the result that customer order flow is 
informative and that intermediaries can 
profitably use the information learned 
from their customer order flow.
The  last  paper  of  the  conference, 
presented  by  Christian  Voigt 
(Deutsche Börse AG) studies differences 
in  intraday  pattern  of  Principal-  and 
Agent  Account  Trading  at  Xetra.  The 
paper provides empirical evidence that 
Agent-Account  trading  dominates  the 
beginning  of  the  trading  day,  while 
Principal-Account  trading  dominates 
the evening. The results are consistent 
with  the  predictions  of  a  theoretical 
model by Hong and Wang (2000).
Both the stimulating discussions during 
the conference and the positive feedback 
received  after  the  conference  provide 
reliable evidence of a successful event. 
The second conference on the Industrial 
Organization  of  Securities  Markets  is 
scheduled for the summer of 2010.
→   All papers presented at the conference are available 
online as CFS Working Papers. 
Asset Management and International Capital Markets
29 – 30 May 2008 
Frankfurt am Main
The objective of the conference on “Asset Management and International Financial Markets” was to bring 
together academics and members of the investment banking community to focus on state-of-the-art academic 
research on asset management and international capital markets. The conference was jointly organized by 
Wolfgang Bessler (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen), Wolfgang Drobetz (University of Hamburg), and Jan 
Pieter Krahnen (Goethe University Frankfurt and CFS).
Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  welcomed  the 
participants  to  Frankfurt.  He  strongly 
emphasized  the  importance  of  an 
exchange  of  ideas  between  academic 
researchers and practitioners as well as 
the implementation of research findings 
in asset management.
Wolfgang Bessler also welcomed the 
participants in his opening speech. He 
underlined the international focus of the 
conference. Initially intended as a small 
international academic research confer-
ence  it  attracted  tremendous  interest 
in that more than 80 academic papers 
were  submitted  for  presentation.  The 
final conference program featured key-
note  speeches,  four  academic  sessions, 
and a panel discussion to cover a wide 
range of issues on asset management in 
international financial markets. The pro-
gram also attracted great interest from 
the asset management industry in that 
about 40 academics and 80 practitioners 
attended this two-day event. 
In  the  first  keynote  speech  Gordon 
Alexander (University of Minnesota) 
provided a brief review of the develop-
ment from Markowitz’s portfolio theory 
to modern risk management techniques. 
He  then  discussed  more  sophisticated 
tools for measuring and managing risk. 
In particular, Alexander focused on the 
adequacy of value-at-risk measures and 
on the impact on investment outcomes 
of  a  portfolio  manager  who  is  faced 
with  investment  restrictions  based  on 
conventional value-at-risk measures. For 
example, a wide range of efficient low-
risk  portfolios  may  become  infeasible 
under these constraints. As a result, the 
portfolio manager might end up choosing 
a  portfolio  with  an  unnecessarily  high 
standard deviation. He proposed using 
the  conditional  value-at-risk  as  an 
alternative, which is the expected loss 
given  that  the  loss  is  greater  than  the 
value-at-risk.  Therefore,  this  measure 
takes the shape of the return distribution 
below  the  value-at-risk  into  account. 
Gordon  Alexander  also  presented 
evidence that even the combination of 
conventional  value-at-risk  measures 
with commonly used stress tests cannot 
adequately determine minimum capital 
requirements because bank trading books 
usually  contain  short  positions.  Again, 
the  conditional  value-at-risk  measure 
could improve the currently employed 
methodologies.
The organizers Wolfgang Drobetz (left), Wolfgang Bessler (3rd from left) and Jan Pieter Krahnen (right),  
together with Yakov Amihud (2nd from left) and Gordon Alexander.
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The first session on Investment Models 
and  Asset  Pricing  was  chaired  by 
Richard Stehle (Humboldt University 
Berlin). Focusing on the impact of long-
run consumption risk on equity prices, 
Jesper Rangvid (Copenhagen Business 
School) demonstrated that in this novel 
setting the magnitude of the empirically 
measured  risk  aversion  of  investors 
appears to be more realistic than in prior 
studies. However, a focus on long-run 
consumption risk cannot help to explain 
the  cross-country  dispersion  in  excess 
returns.  Andreas  Schrimpf  (Centre 
for  European  Economic  Research, 
ZEW,  Mannheim)  highlighted  in  his 
discussion  the  importance  of  long-run 
consumption  growth  in  asset  pricing 
models  compared  to  contemporaneous 
consumption  growth,  but  also  warned 
that  the  explanatory  power  of  the 
model  is  still  limited.  Alexandros 
Kostakis  (University  of  York)  argued 
in  the  next  presentation  that  the  use 
of  conventional  performance  measures 
such as the Sharpe ratio or Jensen’s alpha 
induce an incentive for fund managers to 
actively load higher moment risks. This 
strategy  enables  them  to  outperform 
conventional  benchmarks  that  do  not 
account for these risks. Empirically, he 
provided evidence that a large number of 
U.K. unit trusts did indeed load negative 
co-skewness risk, which contributes to 
the skewness of a fund’s returns. In his 
discussion Yvan Lengwiler (University 
of  Basel)  pointed  out  that  including 
higher  moments  into  performance 
models might be a never ending game 
as fund managers then have an incentive 
to load the next higher moment risk. As 
a result, portfolio managers may always 
be able to game the applied performance 
measures.
Dr. Heinz J. Hockmann (CEO, Fortis 
Investments) outlined from a practitio-
ner’s perspective the future positioning 
of asset management firms. He encour-
aged  the  industry  to  put  more  effort 
into research and product development 
and strongly supported the view that a 
close relationship between academia and 
industry is especially valuable in the field 
of  asset  management.  He  encouraged 
the participants to intensify their coop-
eration.  Furthermore,  he  commented 
on  the  increasing  role  of  distributors 
in  the  asset  management  industry  and 
suggested that the increase in fees over 
the last decade can partly be explained 
by the payment of higher provisions to 
distribution channels.
The  first  afternoon  session  on  “Bond 
Portfolio  Management”  was  chaired 
by  Yvan  Lengwiler  (University 
of  Basel).  Mats  Hansson  (Swedish 
School  of  Economics,  Helsinki) 
presented  new  empirical  evidence  on 
the diversification benefits of investing 
in  international  government  bonds, 
emerging  market  debt  as  well  as  in 
corporate  bonds  from  the  perspective 
of bond investors domiciled in different 
countries. According to their empirical 
results, developed markets’ government 
bonds  do  not  improve  the  risk-return 
spectrum even if currency risk is hedged 
or short sales are restricted. In contrast, 
when short sales are allowed, currency 
hedged  corporate  bonds  and  emerging 
market  bonds  can  offer  diversification 
benefits.  In  her  discussion,  Florinda 
Silva (University of Minho) questioned 
to  which  extend  the  results  might  be 
driven  by  time  variability  in  returns 
and  risk.  She  suggested  extending 
the  paper  by  considering  the  effects 
of duration diversification. In the next 
presentation,  Marcel  Marekwica 
(University  of  Regensburg)  explained 
the impact that different tax treatments 
of  financial  assets  have  on  investment 
decisions and that this depends on the 
account in which these assets are held. 
He  showed  that  the  “tax  gift”  can  be 
interpreted  as  an  unobservable  bond 
position  in  the  optimization  problem 
which  affects  the  asset  allocation  over 
the life cycle. Eva Liljeblom (Swedish 
School  of  Economics,  Helsinki)  noted 
in her discussion that the framework of 
the model could easily be extended to 
analyze the impact of different tax rates, 
changes in stock volatility or alternative 
dividend policies.
Martin  Weber  (University  of 
Mannheim)  chaired  the  subsequent 
session  on  “International  Stock  Invest-
ments”.  Harald  Lohre  (University 
of  Zurich  and  Union  Investment 
Institutional  GmbH)  presented  new 
evidence  on  international  price  and 
earnings  momentum.  Focusing  on  17 
developed  stock  markets,  his  results 
suggest that price momentum in most 
cases seems to be earnings momentum 
in  disguise.  This  relation  is  especially 
evident  for  European  stock  markets. 
Furthermore,  the  momentum  effect 
seems  to  be  stronger  among  stocks 
with high information uncertainty and 
arbitrage costs. Dieter Hess (University 
of Cologne) suggested in his discussion to 
incorporate analysts’ forecast revisions as 
an additional source of new information 
into  the  analysis.  R.  David  McLean 
(University  of  Alberta)  demonstrated 
how  aggregate  share  issuance  can  be 
used  to  predict  the  cross-section  of 
international stock market returns. Based 
on an empirical study of 41 countries, he 
concluded that low returns follow share 
issuances  and  positive  returns  follow 
share  repurchases.  The  importance  of 
this  effect  is  comparable  to  the  book-
to-market  effect  and  is  higher  than 
both  the  size  and  momentum  effects. 
Countries in which it is easier to issue 
or repurchase shares exhibit a stronger 
issuance  effect.  The  discussant,  Axel 
Kind  (University  of  Basel),  suggested 
linking  the  issuance  effect  to  other 
return  effects  by  introducing  further 
control  variables  such  as  liquidity  or 
idiosyncratic volatility.
In  a  provoking  speech  entitled  “The 
Speculative Dynamics of World Equity 
Markets”  Werner  DeBondt  (DePaul 
University, Chicago) presented empirical 
evidence  that  the  anomalous  behavior 
of  short-run  momentum  and  long-run 
reversal of individual stocks also appear 
in  country  indices  in  a  sample  of  the 
G7  countries  and  12  small  countries. 
The  winners  of  the  previous  three 
months tend to continue to outperform 
loser  markets.  For  three  year  periods 
this  effect  reverses.  Over  longer  time 
horizons,  previously  underperforming 
countries outperform past winners. The 
highest returns can be earned on those 
country  indices  that  performed  poorly 
over the past three years, but belong to 
the winners of the previous six months. 
DeBondt calls these “cheap” winners. In 
contrast, expensive losers subsequently 
experience  the  strongest  under-
performance.  It  is  surprising  that  this 
anomalous return behavior persists over 
several years, as cheap investment tools 
such as country exchange traded funds 
can easily be used to exploit these effects. 
In  his  conclusions  Werner  DeBondt 
stressed to incorporate behavioral factors 
into the decision process.
Wolfgang  Drobetz  (University  of 
Hamburg)  welcomed  the  participants 
and introduced Yakov Amihud (New 
York  University),  the  keynote  speaker 
of  the  second  day.  Amihud  addressed 
a  broad  spectrum  of  issues  related  to 
asset  pricing  and  liquidity.  Starting 
from  an  asset  pricing  perspective,  he 
explained the results of several empirical 
studies  which  document  the  relevance 
of a liquidity-risk factor in asset pricing 
models.  Investors  request  a  higher 
return from illiquid securities as they are 
concerned  with  after-cost  returns  and 
take the compounded transaction costs 
over  the  whole  lifetime  of  a  security 
into account. Additionally, the liquidity 
of  individual  securities  is  correlated 
with  the  overall  liquidity  level  of  the 
market.  Consequently,  this  systematic 
liquidity  component  is  a  priced  risk 
factor. Liquidity is not only a relevant 
factor  for  pricing  equities,  but  it  is 
also a priced risk factor for otherwise 
identically  fixed  income  securities. 
Furthermore,  Yakov  Amihud  pointed 
out that an understanding of liquidity is 
of importance for explaining the current 
housing  disaster  in  the  United  States. 
He concluded by advising long-horizon 
investors to invest more heavily in illiquid 
securities if they are able to hold on to 
these securities for an extended period 
of time in order to earn the illiquidity 
premium.
The  forth  academic  session  on  “Per-
formance  Measurement”  was  chaired 
by Hartmut Schmidt (University of 
Heinz J. Hockmann Werner DeBondt
Yakov Amihud28 29
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Hamburg).  In  the  first  presentation, 
Niall O‘Sullivan (University College 
Cork)  investigated  whether  U.K. 
mutual  fund  performance  is  due  to 
investment skill or luck. He presented 
evidence  from  a  sample  of  1,620 
funds,  for  which  several  different 
performance tests were run. The major 
contribution of his paper was to apply a 
bootstrapping technique to improve the 
statistical inferences especially for the 
tails of the cross-sectional performance 
distribution.  The  results  suggest  that 
most  of  the  loser  funds  are  indeed 
unskilled. Moreover, only 7 of the top 20 
ranked funds exhibited any real skill. In 
his discussion, Peter Lückoff (Justus-
Liebig-University  Giessen)  underlined 
the  innovativeness  in  the  statistical 
approach employed but also cautioned 
about the sensitivity of the methodology 
with respect to the actual distributional 
characteristics  of  fund  performance. 
Rajesh  K.  Aggarwal  (University  of 
Minnesota)  analyzed  the  performance 
of  emerging  hedge  fund  managers 
and  introduced  a  new  event  time 
approach to compare the performance 
of  emerging  and  established  hedge 
funds. The results suggest that newly 
started hedge funds offer an attractive 
opportunity, as they provide a superior 
performance  which  persists  for  up  to 
five years. Additionally, these funds are 
still investable and not yet (soft-) closed 
as a result of heavy past inflows. Iwan 
Meier (HEC Montreal) highlighted in 
his discussion the similarity between the 
observations  on  emerging  hedge  fund 
managers  with  tournament  behavior 
and  the  corresponding  risk  taking 
similar to that of mutual funds. In the 
final presentation, Maria Céu Cortez 
(University  of  Minho)  examined  the 
performance  of  European  socially 
responsible  funds.  She  presented 
evidence for neutral performance and 
showed  that  these  funds  are  more 
correlated with overall market indices 
than with social responsibility indices. 
This suggests that either the holdings 
of  socially  responsible  funds  do  not 
deviate much from those of traditional 
funds  or  that  the  risk  characteristics 
of  socially  responsible  companies  are 
not  inherently  different  from  those 
of  traditional  companies.  Thomas 
Burkhardt  (University  of  Koblenz) 
offered in his discussion several possible 
extensions.  For  example,  fund  flows 
into  socially  responsible  funds  could 
also  be  analyzed.  Furthermore,  a 
more detailed discussion of investment 
restrictions might be appropriate.
Dr. Rolf W. Banz, (Chief Investment 
Architect at Pictet Asset Management, 
who  is  well  known  for  his  seminal 
research of the size-effect) recapitulated 
in his speech entitled: “How Relevant 
is Financial Economics for Investors?” 
the  last  twenty  years  of  findings  in 
the field of finance. While noting that 
financial economics is highly important 
for  practical  asset  management,  he 
emphasized  that  communication 
between  researchers  and  practitioners 
must be enhanced and that both must 
learn to talk in the same language.
The  conference  ended  with  a  panel 
discussion on the future of international 
asset  management.  Participants  were 
Rolf Banz, Werner DeBondt, Gordon 
Alexander  and  Heinz  Zimmermann 
(University of Basel). The participants 
delivered some insightful statements on 
a variety of issues. Heinz Zimmermann 
argued that structured finance products 
today  are  too  complex  to  understand 
for most investors and even for some 
of the people selling them. He called 
for  simpler  structures  in  the  future. 
The investor was also at the center of 
the  statement  by  Gordon  Alexander. 
He suggested using a more structured 
investment  process.  Instead  of  the 
common heuristics, investors and banks 
should first determine risk attitude and 
investment horizon, then fix the asset 
universe,  and  finally  pick  stocks  and 
funds.  Werner  DeBondt  emphasized 
Keynote speeches and selected papers from the conference will be published in a 
special issue of the European Journal of Finance edited by Wolfgang Bessler and 
Wolfgang Drobetz.
Panel discussion with Rolf W. Banz, Werner DeBondt, Gordon Alexander and Heinz Zimmermann Rolf W. Banz
that investors need more help with their 
investments. In his opinion, empirical 
evidence  shows  that  they  are  biased 
in  a  systematic  way  and  need  to  be 
protected from their own mistakes. Rolf 
W. Banz gave some insights from the 
industry, noting that some investment 
firms  are  on  their  way  towards 
creating  simpler  structured  products 
and  taking  into  account  the  need  for 
a  structured  investment  process.  All 
panel participants agreed that there is 
much to do, both for academics and for 
practitioners.
After the discussion, Wolfgang Drobetz 
closed  the  conference  by  giving  his 
sincere thanks to all participants.
Peter Lückoff (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen) 
Dirk Schilling (University of Hamburg)
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3rd CFS-DAI Seminar on Risk Management and Value Creation 
“Risk Transfer: from Corporations to Capital Markets”
11 June 2008
Frankfurt am Main
Efficient risk management has become an integral value driver for today’s large corporations, and insurance 
remains an important means of operational risk transfer. After years of stagnant growth, the market for 
Insurance Linked Securities (ILS) has recently witnessed a considerable increase in issues and investor interest. 
As the insurance industry faces new challenges such as regulation and transparency, ILS may finally come 
into its own. For this reason, CFS together with the Deutsche Aktieninstitut e.V. chose to discuss the topic 
“Risk Transfer: from Corporations to Capital Markets” at their 3rd joint seminar, which was held in Frankfurt 
on June 11, 2008. The seminar is part of the CFS program “Insurance and Risk Transfer” and was organized 
by Walther Kiep (Managing Director of Kiep Consulting GmbH) and Christian Laux (Goethe University and 
Program Director at CFS). 
The  program  topics,  presented  and 
analyzed by the distinguished speakers 
and approximately 40 seminar partici-
pants,  provided  valuable  insights  into 
numerous  aspects  of  the  insurance 
risk transfer value chain and potential 
product alternatives.
In his welcoming address, Christian 
Laux  discussed  challenges  in  risk 
transfer. The art involved in designing 
risk transfer instruments and choosing 
between  different  alternatives  is  to 
minimize  the  frictional  cost  of  risk 
transfer.  The  issue  is  not  whether 
risks  are  transferred  to  the  market 
(they are), but how. Traditionally, risk 
is  transferred  to  the  capital  market 
via  insurers’  or  reinsurers’  balance 
sheets.  ILS,  however,  provides  a 
means by which to transfer insurable 
risks  directly  to  the  capital  market, 
using  special  purpose  vehicles  that 
issue claims against specific risks. An 
important aspect here is the choice of 
trigger, which may be indemnity-based 
or parametric. In the former case, the 
sponsor is compensated for the actual 
loss sustained, in the latter the payoff 
is based on an exogenous event. The 
optimal choice of trigger has to trade 
off potential incentive and information 
risks when using an indemnity trigger 
against the basis risk involved with an 
exogenous trigger.
Robert  Herde  (Executive  Director, 
Munich  Re  Capital  Markets  GmbH) 
gave  an  overview  of  current  market 30 31
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developments.  Stressing  the  investor 
side, he noted that ILS products provide 
investors  with  the  option  to  invest 
directly in specific insurance risks. As 
this is not possible when investing in 
insurance  or  reinsurance  companies, 
ILS can be seen to complete the market. 
From  the  perspective  of  insurers 
and  reinsurers,  ILS  have  three  main 
benefits. First, they are collateralized, 
reducing  the  counterparty  risk. 
Second,  they  are  long-term,  ranging 
from  3  to  5  years,  in  contrast  to 
most  reinsurance  contracts,  which 
cover only one year. And third, issuing 
ILS helps to build a reputation in the 
market that is important when funds 
in  the  insurance  market  are  scarce. 
However,  large  setup  costs  for  both 
the originators and investors are still 
a  key  challenge.  Although  improved 
standardizations of ILS products were 
crucial for the recent growth in the ILS 
market, volume continues to play the 
major role. Thus, it is important that 
new products help to increase volume. 
Owing to potential conflicts of interest 
and  transparency,  in  the  long  run, 
capital  market  demand  will  lead  to 
parametric  or  index-based  triggers, 
leaving  it  to  insurers  and  reinsurers 
to  cover  the  basis  risk  involved  with 
these products. While CAT bonds are 
the most prominent example for ILS, 
Herde predicts that the number of ILS 
related to high-frequency risks – such 
as  motor  insurance  –  will  increase. 
It is often argued that because of ILS 
products insurance and capital markets 
will converge. However, Herde argues 
that  such  convergence  would  require 
a  higher  level  of  arbitrage  between 
the  markets,  which  does  not  exist 
in  the  current  niche  situation  of  ILS 
products.
Tore Ellingsen (Managing Director, 
ABN  AMRO  Bank  N.V.)  discussed 
the role of ILS as part of insurers’ and 
reinsurers’ capital management. In the 
face  of  product  market  competition, 
financial  market  pressure,  and 
regulation, efficient capital management 
becomes  increasingly  important. 
Several  insurers  react  by  share-
buybacks, which makes it necessary to 
search for new sources of risk capital. 
Hybrid  capital  and  securitization 
are  important  alternatives,  also  for 
small  insurers  who  still  seem  to  be 
reluctant  to  consider  these  options. 
One  concern  regarding  ILS  products 
with  parametric  or  index  triggers  is 
that it leaves sponsors exposed to basis 
risk. However, as Ellingsen argued, the 
exclusion of certain risks in reinsurance 
contracts since 9/11, has also had the 
effect of leaving insurers with growing 
basis risk when using indemnity-based 
reinsurance. In his view, reinsurers will 
continue to play a significant role even 
if  the  ILS  market  continues  to  grow 
in the wake of Solvency II. Reinsurers 
will serve as a gateway to the capital 
market  for  insurable  risks,  acting  as 
risk  advisers  and  risk  traders,  rather 
than keeping the risks on their balance 
sheets.
Harish Gohil (Senior Director, Fitch 
Rating Ltd.) outlined difficulties facing 
rating agencies in ILS transactions. He 
noted that although the ILS market has 
seen considerable growth, it still remains 
a  small  market.  Its  development  has 
suffered from a challenging regulatory 
framework,  difficulties  in  aligning 
interests  of  investors  and  insurance 
issuers, the complexity of structures, 
and limited investor confidence. One 
of  the  drivers  of  the  ILS  market  has 
been  rating  agency  involvement,  in 
particular  the  issue  of  whether  the 
agencies  provide  meaningful  input  to 
the  rating  analysis  of  the  sponsoring 
insurance  company.  In  its  capacity 
as  a  rating  agency,  Fitch  has  been 
increasing not just the sophistication of 
its approach but also the transparency. 
Modeling the underlying risks is a key 
part of the rating process. Fitch uses 
its  proprietary  stochastic  insurance 
capital modeling tool PRISM, wherever 
possible,  to  derive  the  probability  of 
loss  (PL)  estimates  that  underlie  any 
ILS  rating  decision.  They  are  often 
supplemented  by  estimates  obtained 
from third party modeling agencies.
Reiner Hoffmann (Head of Corporate 
Solutions,  Allianz  Global  Corporate 
&  Specialty  AG)  discussed  ILS  as  a 
potential tool for corporations to deal 
directly  with  risks  that  are  difficult 
to insure. In particular, he considered 
the case of product recall risk in the 
automobile  industry.  Problems  in 
retaining  this  risk  arise  when  there 
is  amplitude  of  suppliers  that  might 
cause the recall, and targeted sanctions 
are  not  possible.  Moreover,  when 
there  is  substantial  credit  risk  with 
small suppliers, the risk is ultimately 
borne  by  the  original  equipment 
manufacturer  (OEM).  Insuring  this 
risk is costly and often not considered 
an option. Hoffmann suggests that the 
OEM  and  suppliers  form  a  risk  pool 
where each contributes according to its 
share in the value chain. In the case of 
a recall, the pool is then used to cover 
the losses without there being a need 
to identify the contractor responsible, 
which is often impossible anyway. By 
securitizing the claims on the risk pool, 
the recall risk may even be transferred 
to third parties. Such a product would 
have several benefits, including a need 
for the explicit consideration of recall 
risks and its awareness in the production 
process.  However,  several  challenges 
remain, including how to determine the 
underlying risk and a fair price as well as 
potential information and moral hazard 
problems.  Furthermore,  securitizing 
the recall risk would require accurate 
modeling tools and information about 
past  losses,  which  are  currently  not 
available.  Specifically,  it  is  the  case 
that a new car series does not of course 
come with any data or prior experience 
of failures. Consequently, the industry 
is still working on a sustainable solution 
to address the challenges imposed by 
recall risk.
Insurance  and  financing  differ  with 
respect to accounting principles, taxes, 
and regulation. Whether an instrument 
constitutes  insurance  or  financing 
is,  therefore,  of  great  importance. 
Johannes  Wedding  (Managing 
Director  and  Partner,  Wedding  & 
Partner) focused on the legal definition 
of  insurance  and  its  implications. 
The  definition  of  insurance  differs 
according to the underlying accounting 
principles  involved,  i.e.  IAS  /  IFRS, 
German  GAAP,  US  GAAP,  or  the 
International  Association  of  Insurance 
Super  visors  (IAIS).  Important  issues 
in  the  definition  of  insurance  include 
the  distinction  between  timing  risk 
and  underwriting  risk  as  well  as 
the  significance  of  the  involved  risk
t  ransfer.  Wedding  discussed  to  what 
extent  companies  are  able  to  set  up 
liability  reserves  within  their  own 
balance sheet as a means of “risk transfer 
to equity claimants”. This is a crucial 
point  because  it  entails  establishing 
whether  tax  benefits  may  be  realized 
(both  saving  on  traditional  insurance 
tax  and  lowering  the  company’s  base 
for  tax)  or  not.  Both  US-GAAP  and 
IAS allow risk retention in the presence 
of  significant  underwriting  risk,  i.e. 
when  the  latter  arise  from  previous 
corporate  activity  (such  as  product 
liability).  Wedding  discusses  these 
issues in greater detail in an article that 
is forthcoming in “Der Betrieb”.
Walther  Kiep  hosted  a  panel  with 
leading  experts  to  discuss  the  latest 
developments  in  ILS  and  its  implica-
tions. Participants on the panel were 
Frank Achtert (Managing Director, 
Guy  Carpenter  &  Company  GmbH), 
Werner  Görg  (CEO,  Gothaer 
Group), Jens Lindner (Head of Third 
Party  Securitisation,  Commerzbank 
AG), Henning Ludolphs (Director, 
Insurance Linked Securities, Hannover 
Re), and Samuel Scherling (Founder, 
ILS Value Advisors AG). The panelists 
agreed that the ILS market will con-
tinue to grow. Under current solvency 
regulation,  there  is  no  capital  relief 
for  securitized  risks,  in  contrast  to 
reinsured  risks.  Thus,  Solvency  II  is 
expected  to  boost  the  importance  of 
ILS, provided that there is no political 
opposition against this trend. Aligning 
issuers’ and investors’ interests remains 
the  main  challenge  when  structuring 
products.  Of  particular  importance 
is  the  issue  of  transparency  and  the 
ability to model the underlying risks.
ARBITRAGE BETWEEN INSURANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
DOES NOT EXIST IN THE CURRENT NICHE SITUATION
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Reinsurers but also reinsurance brokers 
will increasingly act as risk consultants 
in  the  securitization  process.  As 
the  level  of  securitization  increases, 
reinsurers are also likely to shift from 
taking and bearing risk to valuing and 
distributing it.
ILS products, in particular cat bonds, 
have  lived  up  to  the  claim  of  being 
zero beta assets, as spreads have been 
largely unaffected by the recent capital 
market  turmoil.  However,  observing 
prices is difficult due to the buy and 
hold strategy of ILS investors, which is 
dominated by a small group of highly 
specialized and sophisticated players.
As  the  ILS  market  competes  with 
the  reinsurance  market,  the  current 
soft  reinsurance  market  with  low 
reinsurance prices is seen as one reason 
why the ILS market has hitherto failed 
to  experience  larger  growth  rates.  It 
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is  predicted  that  the  next  wave  of 
catastrophes will greatly increase ILS 
activities,  which  will  also  receive  an 
additional boost from the progressive 
standardization of the products.
Center for Financial Studies kicks off nomination process for the 
“Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2009”
In 2009, the Center for Financial Studies 
and  Goethe  University  will  award  for 
the third time the Deutsche Bank Prize 
in  Financial  Economics.  The  prize 
will be presented to an internationally 
re  nowned researcher, in recognition of 
an out  standing achievement in the field 
of finan  cial economic research.
Since  the  beginning  of  October,  more 
than 3,600 academics from over 55 coun-
tries have been given the opportunity to 
take part in the nomination procedure.
The winner of the award, which carries 
an  endowment  of  €50,000,  will  be 
announced in February 2009. 
“We can observe with a certain degree 
of pride that the number of participating 
professors  and  academics  eligible  to 
nominate a potential prize winner has 
risen  from  roughly  1,400  in  2005  to 
almost 3,600 today. This bears witness 
to  the  constantly  growing  awareness 
and the increasing recognition that our 
academic prize for financial economics 
enjoys,” explained Professor Jan Pieter 
Krahnen, Jury Chairman and Director 
of the Center for Financial Studies.
The Jury members are widely acclaimed 
financial  experts  from  different 
countries with academic and practice-
oriented  backgrounds.  Representing 
Goethe  University  on  the  Jury  this 
year, alongside the Jury chairman Jan 
Pieter  Krahnen  (CFS  Director  and 
Goethe  University),  Volker  Wieland 
(CFS Director and Goethe University), 
and Otmar Issing (CFS President and 
Goethe  University),  are  the  well-
known professors Michael Binder and 
Reinhard H. Schmidt. Norbert Walter, 
Managing Director of Deutsche Bank 
Research  and  Chief  Economist  of 
Deutsche Bank AG, is also acting as a 
Jury member. 
The  Organisation  for  Economic 
Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD)  is  represented  by  its  Chief 
Economist,  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel. 
With the appointment of Takatoshi Ito 
(University of Tokyo), the Jury includes 
for  the  first  time  an  academic  from 
Asia.  Furthermore,  Maria  Vassalou 
(SAC Capital Advisors LLC) and Marti 
Subrahmanyam  (University  of  New 
York) are also serving as international 
Jury members.
The award itself will be presented by 
Josef  Ackermann,  the  Chairman  of 
the Management Board and the Group 
Executive  Committee  of  Deutsche 
Bank AG at a ceremony in Frankfurt 
on  September  30,  2009.  During  the 
course  of  the  award  ceremony,  a 
scientific CFS Symposium will be held 
at  Campus  Westend  that  will  focus 
on  the  research  subject  of  the  prize 
winner.
The  Center  for  Financial  Studies,  in 
cooperation  with  Goethe  University, 
first established an academic prize in 
2004.  Since  then,  this  prize,  which 
is  sponsored  by  the  Deutsche  Bank 
Donation Fund, has been presented as 
the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial 
Economics.  It  was  awarded  for  the 
first time in 2005 to Eugene F. Fama, 
Professor of Finance at the University of 
Chicago, for developing and researching 
the  concept  of  market  efficiency.  In 
2007,  Michael  Woodford,  Professor 
of  Political  Economy  at  Columbia 
University in New York, received the 
prize for his research on the theory of 
monetary macroeconomics.
Sabine Neumann (CFS)
Email: db-prize@ifk-cfs.de  •  www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
•   Jury comprises international financial experts from research and practice
•   Some 3,600 academics from around the world can propose nominees 
•   Jury is looking for outstanding academic submissions with practical application
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Special Special
It has now become a tradition that 
the  ECB  President  JEAN-CLAUDE 
TRICHET  opens  the  conference 
with  a  key  note  address.  This 
year,  Trichet  spoke  on  the  topic 
“Risk  and  the  Macro-economy” 
and  investigated  the  fundamental 
connection between financial risk 
and  macroeconomic  performance. 
He began by explaining that after
a time of ample financial liquidity 
and  exceptionally  low  rewards  to 
risk, the loss of value of whole classes 
of  real  assets  has  led  to  a  sharp 
reduction  in  investor  appetite.  In 
addition,  rising  commodity  prices 
have  reduced  households’  income 
prospects and raised their aversion 
to risk. “To the extent that the more 
recent turn in the markets correct 
past  excesses,  this  is  a  welcome 
– if painful – process that we had 
anticipated  and  asked  market 
participants to prepare for in past 
interventions,” noted Trichet.
The  decline  in  risk  valuation, 
which  has  been  partly  reversed 
in  the  recent  financial  turmoil, 
started  25  years  ago  along  with  a 
similar  decline  in  macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Trichet suggested that 
“to the extent that this moderation 
in macroeconomic fluctuations – in 
aggregate risk – would be confirmed 
as  a  permanent  acquisition  of 
modern  economies,  there  is  some 
reason  to  believe  that  the  trend 
to  lower  risk  valuations  –  beyond 
the needed corrections of the more 
recent excesses – could in the end 
reassert  itself.”  Consequently, 
it  is  important  to  analyze  what 
determined  this  compression 
of  risk  in  effectively  all  markets 
and,  whether  the  compression  of 
risk  reflected  permanent  shifts  or 
transient ones.
Turning  to  the  recent  financial 
crisis  Trichet  noted  that  “spreads 
on  financial  institution  debt,  in 
particular,  have  widened  in  the 
Euro area and in the U.S. reflecting 
uncertainty  over  the  extent  of 
future  credit  write-offs,  the  full 
recognition  of  off-balance-sheet 
commitments, and future earnings 
capacity.”  The  results  are  that 
intermediaries  save  on  capital,
assets  are  sold  and  lending 
conditions  get  squeezed.
According  to  Trichet,  the  recent 
corrections  and  expenditure 
reductions of the financial markets 
convey  two  lessons:  (i)  non-
fundamental  market  dynamics 
have  grown  out  of  fundamentals 
and the feed-back loops that these 
have  created,  and  (ii)  excessive 
leverage  was  the  mechanism 
which  turned  an  efficient  process 
of  risk  diffusion  into  a  dangerous 
spiral  of  risk  amplifications  and 
concentration.  Finally,  Trichet 
THE ECB AND ITS
WATCHERS X
5 September 2008
Frankfurt am Main
CONFERENCE
JEAN-CLAUDE TRICHET
This year, the CFS celebrated the ten-year anniversary of 
“The ECB and Its Watchers” conference. This series, which 
was initiated in 1999 by Otmar Issing in his role as Chief 
Economist of the ECB and Axel Weber as CFS Director, has 
evolved into a well-established forum for the public exchange 
of  views  between  ECB  decision  makers  and  leading  ECB 
observers and critics. Many ECB watchers have commented 
on the usefulness of this platform for a two-way dialogue 
with policymakers. Perhaps, the greatest compliment to the 
ECB and the conference organizers has been the start of 
similar conference series in the United States in 2007 and in 
the United Kingdom in 2008.
A range of prominent speakers from the ECB, other central 
banks,  academia  and  the  private  sector  debated  the  role 
of the central bank in dealing with liquidity and solvency 
problems  in  the  financial  system  and  the  proper  policy 
responses to asset prices, inflation and economic growth or 
weakness. 
More than 250 participants actively took part in the discussions 
along with more than 60 media and press representatives 
who reported widely on the event. Part of the conference and 
selected interviews were again broadcasted live on business 
TV channels. 
CONFERENCE PICTURES: HANNELORE FÖRSTER
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clarified the difficulties in dealing 
with  a  sequence  of  supply  shocks 
that  may  become  engrained  in 
inflation expectations and turn into 
a  sustained  demand  disturbance. 
The  financial  turbulences,  which 
began  last  summer,  as  well  as  the 
increases  in  commodity  prices, 
have  challenged  central  banks 
to  simultaneously  deal  with  the 
fragilities  of  the  financial  fabric 
and  fight  inflationary  pressures 
and  economic  weakness.  In  such 
“testing times”, the advantages of a 
monetary system, which is anchored 
in price stability, have become very 
visible.
The  remainder  of  the  conference 
program was organized in form of 
four  debates  between  ECB  policy 
makers and observers.
MONETARY POLICY DURING 
THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL: 
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
JÜRGEN  STARK  (ECB)  admitted 
that the past months had been the 
most  challenging  in  the  ten-year 
history  of  the  ECB.  The  ECB  was 
confronted  with  a  “trilemma”, 
consisting of rising inflation rates, 
a  slow-down  of  economic  activity 
and threat to financial stability. In 
his  presentation,  Stark  discussed 
not  only  how  the  principles 
incorporated in the ECB’s monetary 
policy framework have guided the 
ECB’s  decision  making  through 
these times but also how to face the 
challenges still lying ahead.
Stark  emphasized  that  sound 
monetary  policy  making  is 
anchored in a set of principles. Next 
to having a clear and unambiguous 
mandate to maintain price stability, 
a central bank must also be credible 
in  its  commitment  to  deliver  this 
objective. The central bank must be 
a    politically-independent  institu-
tion and transparent in pursuing its 
objective.  Furthermore,  monetary 
policy  should  keep  a  medium-
term  orientation  and  should  be 
strengthened  by  a  comprehensive 
analytical framework. Finally, there 
must be a clear separation between 
the determination of the monetary 
policy stance required to maintain 
price  stability  and  the  provision 
of  liquidity  to  the  money  market, 
such  that  market  participants  do 
not  interpret  liquidity  operations 
as signals of future changes in the 
policy stance.
Reviewing decision making during 
one  year  financial  turmoil  Jürgen 
Stark  noted  the  following:  With 
the  beginning  of  the  financial 
pressures  the  ECB’s  outlook  for 
inflation  and  economic  growth 
became  increasingly  uncertain. 
In  this  situation,  it  was  not  clear 
what  consequences  high  market 
interest  rates  would  have  for 
spending  and  pricing  decision,  as 
well  as  the  availability  of  credit. 
Thus,  having  a  single,  clear  and 
unambiguous  objective  supported 
the  ECB’s  credibility  and  ensured 
that a policy stance appropriate for 
containing  inflation  expectations 
could be maintained.
Simultaneously,  the  ECB  acted 
to  sustain  the  functioning  of  the 
money  market  by  making  a  clear 
distinction  between  the  deter-
mination  of  the  monetary  policy 
stance  and  its  implementation 
through  liquidity  operations. 
The  turmoil  also  encouraged 
and  strengthened  central  banks 
cooperation  through  improved 
information  exchange,  as  well 
as  joint  supervision  of  market 
developments.
Stark’s  debating  partner,  MARVIN 
GOODFRIEND  (Carnegie  Mellon 
University),  then  presented  his 
view more from a U.S. perspective. 
Goodfriend first gave the audience 
some  important  background 
information  about  the  U.S. 
mortgage  market  before  the  onset 
of the turmoil. In this market 50% 
of home mortgages are securitized. 
Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs)  such  as  Fannie  Mae  and 
Freddie  Mac  held  or  guaranteed 
50%  of  all  mortgages.  The  near- 
bank  capital  markets  financed   
long-term  mortgage-backed 
securities  with  short-term 
commercial paper. At the beginning 
of  2004,  asset-backed  commercial 
paper  had  amounted  to  US$  600 
billion but rose to US$ 1200 billion 
by  August  2007.  The  asset-backed 
commercial paper market collapsed 
in August 2007 and contracted by 
about US$ 400 billion by November. 
At  that  point,  the  intransparent, 
tailored  and  tranched  mortgage-
backed  securities  traded  at  deep 
discounts,  commercial  and 
investment banks faced increasing 
capital shortages, widening interest 
rate spreads and elevated interbank 
interest rates.
Goodfriend  then  turned  to  the 
challenges for U.S. monetary policy. 
The  U.S.  economy  is  affected  by 
two  opposing  forces:  aggregate 
demand  is  hurt  by  the  deflation 
in  house  prices  and  the  elevated 
external  finance  premium,  while 
large,  sustained  increases  in  fuel 
and  food  prices  have  driven   
inflation  to  5%.  According  to 
Goodfriend the capital shortage in 
the  banking  system  that  is  at  the 
core of the credit turmoil is more 
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protracted  and  more  serious  than 
might have been expected and may 
still last for a while.
Goodfriend  noted  that  central 
banks  should  be  viewed  as 
executing  two  independent 
policies:  monetary  and  credit 
policy.  Monetary  policy  (i.e.  the 
size  of  the  central  bank’s  balance 
sheet) should be used to set interest 
rates in order to stabilize aggregate 
employment  and  inflation.  Credit 
policy  (i.e.  when  central  banks 
make loans to individual banks to 
stabilize financial markets) should 
be  executed  to  stabilize  financial 
markets. If the Fed keeps the two 
policies  separate,  credit  policy 
changes  the  composition  of  the 
securities  in  its  portfolio,  but  not 
the size of its portfolio.
He  concluded  that  the  Fed  needs 
an “Accord” for credit policy with 
the following principles: (i) the Fed 
undertakes credit policy actions only 
as lender of last resort, (ii) the fiscal 
authorities  cover  the  Fed  against 
balance sheets losses incurred, (iii) 
Fed credit policy should not fund 
loans  or  expenditures  that  ought 
to  get  explicit  authorization  from 
the  fiscal  authorities,  and  (iv)  the 
Fed  should  otherwise  stick  to  the 
Treasuries-only policy.
SOLVENCY, SYSTEMIC RISK 
AND MORAL HAZARD: 
WHERE DOES THE CENTRAL 
BANK’S ROLE BEGIN AND 
WHERE DOES IT END?
LORENZO  BINI  SMAGHI  (ECB) 
started  the  debate  by  re-iterating 
the  ECB’s  “separation  principle” 
namely  to  pursue  the  separate 
objectives of price stability and the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  money 
market  with  separate  instruments 
that  are  the  interest  rate  and 
market operations. In other words, 
the interest rate is not considered 
an  appropriate  tool  to  deal  with 
liquidity  or  solvency  problems, 
because  it  is  too  “blunt”  as  an 
instrument  for  financial  stability 
targeting. It might generate conflict 
with the primary objective of price 
stability  and  un-anchor  inflation 
expectations. 
Next,  Bini  Smaghi,  reviewed  the 
Bagehot  Principle  that  states  that 
central banks are to lend freely at 
a high rate against good collateral 
in  order  to  support  illiquid  but 
solvent  institutions.  Thus, 
the  central  bank  should 
avoid  dealing  with  solvency 
problems  that  would  threaten 
its  financial  independence  and   
increase  moral  hazard  in  the 
financial  system.  However, 
they  should  lend  to  illiquid 
institutions.  Illiquidity  problems 
can lead to  insolvency even  when 
intermediaries  are  fundamentally 
sound. The central bank should act 
to preserve social welfare, because 
it is the only economic agent who is 
not subject to liquidity risk.
With regard to liquidity provision 
central  banks  must  avoid  actions 
that  would  put  at  risk  its  own 
balance sheet and set up adequate 
risk control measures. A risk control 
measure in the Euro area is that it 
accepts as collateral only assets that 
fulfill  high  credit  standards.  The 
broad range of collateral accepted 
by  the  Euro  system  includes  non-
marketable assets (i.e. credit claims), 
as  well  as  marketable  but  less 
liquid  assets  (i.e.  ABS)  making  it 
necessary  to  develop  theoretical 
pricing  capabilities  For  credit 
claims,  NCBs  can  either  compute 
a  theoretical  price  or  use  the 
outstanding  amount  (in  which 
higher haircuts apply). In order to 
revise  the  risk  control  measures, 
the ECB will introduce a number of 
new procedures to be implemented 
February 1, 2009.
WILLEM H. BUITER (LSE) began by 
remarking that the role of the central 
bank in the maintenance of financial 
stability  is  liquidity  management. 
The reason is that the central bank 
is not subject to domestic liquidity 
risk.  Any  country  whose  banking 
system is large und who has a large 
foreign  currency  exposure  may 
face  liquidity  problems.  Buiter 
mentioned in particular the recent 
experience  of  Iceland  but  also 
included the U.K. in this group of 
countries  since  the  British  Pound 
is  not  any  more  a  major  reserve 
currency. There are only two such 
currencies  left  the  US  Dollar  and 
the Euro. 
In  general,  financial  stability  may 
be  threatened  by  three  types  of 
disfunctions:  bubbles,  illiquidity 
and  insolvency.  With  respect  to 
bubbles  Buiter  recommended 
against using the official policy rate 
for  targeting  asset  prices  or  any 
form  of  leaning  against  the  wind, 
but  proposed  regulatory  tools 
instead.  With  regard  to  liquidity 
he differentiated funding liquidity 
and market liquidity. As to funding 
liquidity the central bank ought to 
provide liquidity to systematically 
important  institutions.  However, 
the provision of capital to insolvent 
institutions, Buiter noted, is a fiscal 
task and should not be taken on by 
the central bank.
Financial  stability  also  has  an 
important  temporal  dimension. 
There is the need to minimize the 
implications  of  the  current  crisis 
that  is  the  “putting  out  of  fires”. 
Buiter  reiterated  that  the  central 
bank  should  put  its  expertise,  its 
resources  and  reputation  on  the 
line  with  regard  to  the  provision 
of liquidity, i.e. its lender or market 
maker  of  last  resort  function. 
The  central  bank  should  at  most 
use  its  expertise  as  an  agent  of 
the  government  in  dealing  with 
solvency  problems.  It  should  not 
risk its own resources or reputation 
to save insolvent institutions.
Buiter  then  acknowledged  that 
the central bank may find it hard 
to  keep  separate  the  provision  of 
liquidity  to  illiquid  but  solvent 
and to insolvent institutions. Thus, 
there  always  exists  the  risk  of  a 
capital  loss  to  the  central  bank  if 
the borrower and the issuer of the 
collateral put up by the borrower 
default  simultaneously.  Buiter 
recommended as a partial solution 
that  the  central  bank  should 
eliminate  ex-ante  quasi  fiscal 
actions,  that  is,  when  it  lends  it 
should take sufficient collateral and 
price  it  punitively  such  that  the 
central  bank  does  not  provide  a 
subsidy to the borrower. There may 
still occur ex-post capital losses to 
the central bank but these should 
be  fiscalized  immediately  and 
automatically. 
HARALD  UHLIG  (University  of 
Chicago), the third speaker in this 
debate,  set  out  to  characterize 
the  links  between  what  he  called 
the  subprime  innovation  and  the 
moral hazard crisis. The subprime 
innovation  allowed  young  home 
owners  to  borrow  on  future   
incomes,  a  good  thing.  The 
securitization  of  mortgages  by 
standard  Government  Sponsored 
Enterprises  (GSEs)  such  as  Fannie 
Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  proved 
risky. Associated derivatives, MBS, 
CDO  were  particularly  risky  with 
some  parts  well  characterized  as 
“toxic waste”. With the houses still 
there, Uhlig said, it is a crisis of the 
financial markets about involuntary 
redistribution  and  bailouts.  In 
this  context,  he  brought  up  two 
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old principles with new additions. 
First,  if  something  is  too  good  to 
be true, it probably is. Second, as 
Bagehot  suggested  in  1873,  in  a   
crisis a lender of last resort should 
lend at a penalty rate to solvent but 
illiquid  banks  that  have  adequate 
collateral.  New  additions  seem  to 
be  the  “too  big  to  fail  doctrine” 
and  “there  is  systemic  risk  which 
requires action”.
For  the  remainder  of  his   
presentation  Uhlig  discussed 
several aspects of the recent crisis 
and the associated moral hazard in 
more detail and promised to deliver 
three  new  principles.  His  review 
led Uhlig to a number of insights. 
First,  the  risks  in  the  real  estate 
market  are  smaller  than  in  the   
stock  market,  and  smaller  than 
exchange  rate  risks,  but  those 
risks  were  not  allocated  properly.   
Second,  implicit  government 
guarantees  create  moral  hazard 
and  in  turn,  lack  of  regulatory 
information creates fear at central 
banks. Third, it is a fact that there 
are macroeconomic risks as it is a 
fact  that  banks  can  go  bankrupt. 
Not  everything  can  be  insured 
thus  it  is  important  to  help  the 
appropriate allocation and pricing 
of  macroeconomic  risks.  Uhlig 
emphasized that in an emergency, 
central  banks  need  to  understand 
the consequences before acting.
Uhlig  concluded  with  three  new 
principles  for  central  banks. 
Principal  1:  Do  not  provide 
insurance  for  free.  Principal  2: 
Practice  gentle  prodding  through 
information advantage. Principal 3: 
Aid the appropriate allocation and 
pricing of macroeconomic risks.
ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND 
MONETARY POLICY: WHAT 
CAN OR SHOULD THE CENTRAL 
BANK DO ABOUT THEM?
HANS  GENBERG  (Hong  Kong 
Monetary  Authority)  began  by 
stating  the  claim  that  “a  central 
bank  concerned  with  stabilizing 
inflation  about  a  specific  target 
level  is  likely  to  achieve  superior 
performance by adjusting its policy 
instruments  not  only  in  response 
to  its  forecasts  of  future  inflation 
and  the  output  gap,  but  also  to 
asset  prices.”  Or  in  other  words, 
the  question  is  whether  a  central 
bank  should  take  into  account   
movements  in  asset  prices  “over 
and above” their influence on the 
inflation gap and the output gap? 
This, in turn, depends very much on 
what is meant by “over and above”. 
If  the  objective  of  the  central 
bank  is  defined  as  minimizing 
the  discounted  sum  of  expected 
fluctuations of inflation and output 
around  their  respective  target   
levels,  we  cannot  debate  “over 
and above”, because all applicable 
information,  including  that 
embedded  in  asset  prices,  is 
implicitly considered.
The  question  makes  sense  when  a 
policy  reaction  function  defines   
the  policy  rate  with  respect  to 
inflation and output gap forecasts 
at  a  specific  horizon  (generally 
two years). The proposal is not to 
stabilize  asset  prices  directly,  i.e. 
making  it  an  additional  target  in 
the objective function. This would 
necessitate  very  large  adjustments 
in  the  policy  interest  rates  and 
destabilize  inflation,  output  and 
employment. Yet the debate is more 
about  a  “muted”  leaning  against 
the  wind.  Directly  targeting  an 
asset  price  would  be  risky,  if  not 
dangerous, because we do not know 
for  certain  what  its  equilibrium 
is. With the uncertainty about the 
equilibrium  value,  we  must  allow 
for mistakes.
THOMAS  MAYER  (Deutsche  Bank) 
elaborated  further  on  the  pros 
and  cons  of  taking  asset  prices 
into  consideration  when  making 
monetary  policy  decisions.  One 
reason why not is that the central 
bank’s  mandate  for  price  stability 
refers to CPI inflation. In following 
this  mandate,  the  central  bank 
already considers asset prices to the 
extent that they affect CPI inflation. 
A  reason  for  considering  asset 
prices arises from the fact that asset 
prices  reflect  the  price  of  income 
streams in order to finance future 
consumption. This price should not 
be  separated  from  the  definition 
of  price  stability.  Moreover,  asset 
price  cycles  can  threaten  the 
economy  without  first  affecting 
CPI inflation.
Mayer gave a number of suggestions 
how  central  banks  can  respond. 
They  should  form  an  opinion  on 
how  bubbles  develop.  Positive 
as  well  as  negative  bubbles  are 
triggered  by  large  cyclical  swings 
in the willingness to tolerate risk. 
Mayer  also  proposed  to  “tilt  the 
risk free central bank rate against 
large  swings  in  risk  appetite.” 
By  doing  so,  central  banks  will 
hopefully  recognize  developing 
bubbles.  The  ECB’s  two  pillars 
strategy is “tilting in practice” but 
seems too narrow in that it “consists 
of a detailed analysis of monetary 
and  credit  developments  with  a 
view to assessing their implications 
for  future  inflation  and  economic 
growth.”  Besides  the  monetary 
analysis,  a  comprehensive  analysis 
of the different risk attitudes among 
professionals and private investors 
must  include  an  evaluation  of 
changes in applied credit standards 
and  credit  quality;  bond,  credit 
and  equity  risk  premia;  various 
asset valuation indicators in equity 
and real estate markets, as well as 
various measures of “risk appetite”.
LOOKING AHEAD: HOW TO 
REIGN IN INFLATION AND 
MAINTAIN STABLE GROWTH?
ATHANASIOS  ORPHANIDES   
(Central  Bank  of  Cyprus) 
started  by  pointing  out  that 
inflation  in  the  Euro  area  has 
remained  considerably  above   
the  level  consistent  with  price 
stability  since  the  fall  2007  which 
poses  a  critical  challenge  for  the   
ECB. The peak of 4 % observed in   
June  and  July  has  been 
unprecedented  in  the  history  of 
the  Euro  system.  The  increase  in 
inflation  reflects  more  the  global 
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increase  of  the  prices  of  food, 
energy and other commodities than 
an  underlying  trend.  Looking  at 
the measure of core inflation that 
excludes  energy  and  unprocessed 
food for example, the recent pick-up 
in inflation is less dramatic, though 
still  worrisome.  This  difference 
between  total  and  core  measures 
of  inflation  is  a  manifestation  of 
an  adverse  supply  shock  not 
dissimilar  to  earlier  experiences 
of  such  shocks.  High  and  volatile 
stagflation,  coupled  with  rising 
unemployment and anemic growth, 
are not items on any policymaker’s 
wish list. Adverse supply shocks all 
have  a  similar  initial  impact  but 
the damage caused beyond that in 
the  eco  nomy  depends  on  various 
factors.  Importantly,  it  depends 
on the responses of monetary and 
fiscal  policy  and  the  underlying 
policy strategy.
What  should  be  expected  beyond 
the  first  round?  According  to 
Orphanides  an  important  lesson 
of  the  experiences  of  the  1970s 
is  that  the  eventual  economic 
consequences  of  an  adverse 
supply  shock  depend  crucially 
on  whether  monetary  policy 
allows  the  first  round  of 
inflation  effects  to  propagate
further  into  a  wage  price  spiral. 
Tolerating second round effects on 
inflation can be devastating to the 
economy  and  can  result  in  both 
lower growth and higher inflation 
over time. It is all too easy to fall 
into  the  trap  of  pursuing  over 
expansionary  policy.  Slower 
growth  for  some  time  may  be  a 
discomfort that should be tolerated 
rather  than  resisted  to  avoid 
accumulating  imbalances  that 
may be costlier to address later. To 
avoid the materialization of second 
round  effects  it  is  imperative  for 
policymakers  to  do  what  it  takes 
to keep inflation expectations well 
anchored. This can be achieved at 
a lower cost, if structural elements 
are  in  place  that  prevent  the 
propagation  to  further  wage  and 
price increases.
The  ECB’s  strategy  must  exactly 
be  seen  in  this  context.  This  is 
why  the  Governing  Council  has 
taken a resolute stance against the 
materialization  of  broad  based 
second  round  effects  in  the  Euro 
area.  Orphanides  concluded  that 
allowing  expectations  to  become 
unmoved  from  the  price  stability 
objective  will  be  detrimental  not 
only to price developments, but also 
to  employment  and  growth  down 
the road. Thus, the ECB’s aim must 
be to avoid this trap.
LAURENCE  MEYER  (Macro  eco-
nomic  Advisers)  provided  a  U.S. 
perspective  on  the  question 
of  reigning  in  inflation  and 
maintaining sustainable growth. In 
terms  of  principles,  Meyer  firmly 
supported an explicit (qualitative) 
dual mandate for the central bank 
that  covers  inflation  and  growth. 
The  inflation  objective  should  be 
for the medium-term and although 
the target should be set for headline 
inflation,  the  central  bank  should 
monitor the success by focusing on 
core inflation. Meyer recommended 
a  forward  looking  Taylor  rule 
as  strategy.  In  this  context,  it  is 
ANGEL UBIDE (TUDOR INVESTMENT CORP):
“The ECB and its Watchers” has played a critical role in allowing a brainstorming of 
the relevant issues pertaining to the ECB with the participation of the key actors, 
policy makers, market participants and academics. One day at the conference is much 
more effective than weeks of individual research. It has also created a very extensive 
and useful network of people interested in ECB matters.
important  to  anchor  the  long-
term  inflation  expectations  and 
communicate consistently.
Meyer then turned to the current 
situation of the U.S. economy. It has 
slowed  down  significantly  due  to 
three shocks: a housing correction, 
a  credit  shock  and  a  long  rise  in 
energy  prices.  While  GDP  shortly 
expanded  in  the  second  quarter 
by  3.3%  compared  to  a  long-
run  trend  of  2.5%,  Meyer  sees  it 
slowing to zero in the second half 
into  “a  danger  zone  for  monetary 
policy.”  Although  optimistic  that 
the  economy  will  return  back  to 
trend next year he noted enormous 
uncertainty  and  emphasized 
that  unemployment  is  clearly  on 
an  upward  path.  In  August,  the 
unemployment rate rose from 5.7% 
to  6.1%  and  FOMC  projections 
indicated a rise in the unemployment 
rate  that  lingers  considerably  and 
suggest  very  limited  progress 
in  2009  and  the  year  after  given 
appropriate policy. Thus, in order 
to  deal  with  the  consequences  of 
core  inflation  being  elevated  the 
FOMC is willing to tolerate a period 
of below trend growth and a high 
and  lingering  unemployment  rate. 
Meyer argued that the FOMC may 
be  more  transparent  than  the 
ECB  by  publishing  three-year-
ahead  projections  of  inflation, 
unemployment and growth.
In  thinking  about  how  the  Fed 
should  be  responding  to  the 
current situation Meyer presented 
detailed  information  on  recession 
probability  models  and  own 
forecasts  pointing  to  a  significant 
risk of slipping into a recession in 
the  near  term  while  inflation  is 
high.  Although  core  inflation  is 
expected  to  rise  beyond  2.5%  in 
the second half of the year Meyer 
expects  a  moderation  of  inflation 
in  the  future.  Energy  prices  are 
declining  and  prospects  have 
improved  that  they  will  remain 
stable  in  the  next  two  years.  The 
dollar  has  stabilized  and  will 
perhaps  slightly  appreciate,  and 
slack  in  the  economy  will  reduce 
inflation.
Meyer concluded by discussing the 
policy  implications  of  the  credit 
crisis, inflation and unemployment 
outlooks  through  the  lens  of  a 
forward-looking  Taylor  rule. 
Credit spreads and risk premia are 
factors  that  should  lower  the  real 
neutral funds rate. He believes the 
Fed  has  therefore  little  insurance 
built  into  the  funds  rate  setting. 
The  response  of  the  funds  rate 
to  the  adverse  supply  shock  then 
depends  very  much  on  how  well-
anchored  inflation  expectations 
are.  With  well-anchored  inflation 
expectations  the  funds  rate  does 
not need to be raised in response to 
an adverse supply shock but could 
even ease in order to offset some of 
the growth impact of this shock. 
Celia Wieland (CFS)
JÖRG KRÄMER (COMMERZBANK AG):
The ECB Watchers conference brings together 
central bankers, academics and bank economists. 
This mixture delivers a very good understanding
of the ECB’s monetary policy.
PETER HOOPER (DEUTSCHE BANK):
Especially for any observer from across the 
Atlantic, this series has been an excellent source 
of information about how policy-oriented 
thinking and research on critical issues at the 
euro area’s central bank have progressed over its 
first ten years.
HARALD UHLIG (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO):
The forum has been the central open venue for communicating and discussing 
the results of leading ECB watchers. For example, I have had the opportunity 
to co-author several “Monitoring the European Central Bank” (MECB) reports 
for the CEPR in London. While these reports were presented elsewhere too, 
and while we were also particularly grateful to then ECB council member and 
director of economics and research, Prof. Dr. Otmar Issing, to always grant us 
an open-minded discussion about our findings with him and the ECB staff, the 
forum was the final, critical venue for discussion. The forum therefore played a 
crucial role for the debate on monetary policy in Europe.44 45
Ms.  Berès  and  President  Weber, 
what  are  the  most  important 
lessons that we should draw from 
the recent experience regarding 
monetary policy during financial 
turmoil?
Berès:  The  ECB’s  strategy  to 
inject  right  in  the  beginning  of 
the crisis liquidity and to maintain 
interest  rates,  contrasting  with 
the  Fed’s  important  rate  cuts 
was welcomed as a level-headed 
response. This might very well be 
true in the short term, but on the 
long run, with the crisis hitting 
the  real  economy  and  with  the 
additional  rise  of  commodity 
prices, that I characterize as the 
emergence  of  a  second  age  of 
globalization, this strategy is put 
into question if it is acting alone 
and  harshly  reminds  us  of  the 
Eurozone’s Achilles’ heel: it’s lack 
of economic coordination and of 
intervention tools when it comes 
to mastering a crisis.
Weber: It has become clear over 
the past year that there is more 
to  central  banking  than  just 
taking  interest  rate  decisions. 
Liquidity  operations,  financial 
stability  concerns,  and  banking 
supervision  issues  have  kept 
us  busy.  Not  mixing-up  these 
distinct issues was key. Our clear 
separation  of  monetary  policy 
and  liquidity  provision  has 
helped  us  to  ease  strains  in  the 
money markets whilst at the same 
time remaining alert to/on guard 
against  the  substantial  inflation 
risks.
How  should  monetary  policy 
respond  when  the  next  housing 
or asset price bubble comes?
Berès:  The  tackling  of  the  next 
bubble  (actually  commodities 
have  already  become  the  new 
bubble)  shouldn’t  be  an  issue 
that falls into the only realm of 
monetary  policy.  As  legislators 
and  political  actors,  we  should 
make  sure  well  in  advance  that 
the next bubble is used to allocate 
investment  properly,  answering 
the needs of the real economy for 
sustainable financing.
Weber:  We  should  reduce  the 
likelihood  of  re-occurances.  We 
are using our regulatory powers 
to  adjust  the  capital  adequacy 
and  liquidity  management 
framework  for  banking  in  the 
light  of  recent  events.  Aligning 
incentive  structures  and 
reducing  the  pro-cyclicality  of 
the banking and credit business 
is key to avoiding a new round of 
problems.
Is  the  Euro  area  regulatory 
framework  ready  to  deal  with 
the collapse of a major European 
bank?
Berès:  It  is  obvious  that  we  are 
not  only  witnessing  a  massive 
market failure, but also a severe 
regulatory  and  supervisory 
failure.  Both  call  for  strong 
responses  from  policy  makers 
and  regulators.  I  believe  that 
long ago the Commission should 
have  delivered  a  comprehensive 
analysis  of  the  existing  EU 
regulatory  and  supervisory 
framework  in  the  light  of  the 
pre-existing  deficiencies  that 
have  been  highlighted  by  the 
crisis.  After  the  creation  of  the 
Euro  and  the  ECB,  the  strategy 
for financial market’s integration 
lacks  a  supervisory  structure 
where  the  responsibility  of  the 
ECB is crucial.
The  link  between  macro 
prudential  oversight  (macro-
economic  stability  analysis)  and 
micro  prudential  oversight  (the 
actual  supervision  of  financial 
institutions)  has  been  neglected 
in  both  national  and  European 
supervisory  architecture.  I 
therefore  advocate  for  the 
creation  of  a  pan-European 
structure  for  prudential  super-
vision of the major cross-border 
financial  groups,  on  top  of  but 
closely  linked  to  the  existing 
system  of  cooperating  national 
supervisors.  The  main  argument 
for the transfer of the prudential 
supervision  of  these  groups  to 
the European level is the systemic 
risk  that  such  financial  groups 
pose  to  the  entire  EU  financial 
system. This proposal would also 
offer  a  response  to  regulatory 
competition,  where  Member 
States trying to attract the head 
quarters of financial institutions 
not  only  with  fiscal  incentives 
but  also  with  light  regulatory 
regimes.
Weber:  The  Eurosystem’s  swift 
and  continued  intervention  in 
money markets has substantially 
reduced  the  likelihood  of  such 
an event materializing: As for the 
future,  I  am  convinced  that  the 
high degree of connectivity and 
established joint decision-making 
processes  make  the  Eurosystem 
the natural nucleus for any timely 
and  coordinated  response  to 
potential  banking  problems  in 
Europe.
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Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Elena Carletti has received this year’s 
Ladislao  Mittner  prize,  which  is 
given annually under the aegis of the 
German  Academic  Exchange  Service 
(DAAD)  and  the  German  Rectors’ 
Conference  (HRK).  This  award  aims 
to promote and strengthen scientific 
contacts between Germany and Italy, 
and carries a cash amount of € 5,000 
as  well  as  funding  for  a  four-week 
fellowship in Germany.
The award ceremony took place on the 
11th of July 2008 in „Villa Vigoni“ at 
Lake Como in Italy, during the German-
Italian Journalists’ symposium. A panel 
discussion with Elena Carletti on the 
role of Germany and Italy as partners 
in the common European market for 
financial services was held prior to the 
ceremony.
In his speech, Christian Bode (Secretary 
General of DAAD) noted that Carletti, 
who is also the first woman economist 
to  have  received  this  award,  was 
chosen by the jury for her outstanding 
research  in  the  field  of  banking  and 
finance, and its special emphasis on the 
German financial system.
Since October 2008, Carletti has been 
a Professor of Finance at the European 
University Institute (EUI) in Florence, 
where she holds a joint chair Robert 
Schumann  Centre  and  Economics 
Department.  Her  research  interests 
are in the areas of bank competition 
and regulation, financial stability and 
corporate governance.
CFS Researcher Receives Ladislao Mittner Prize
New Researchers at CFS
Marcus Fleig joined the Center for Financial Studies in June 2008 as Young Researcher under the 
supervision of Professor Jan Pieter Krahnen. Prior to joining the CFS, he graduated from Goethe 
University where he majored in Finance, Management and applied Microeconomics. Beside his 
studies at Frankfurt University and the University of Passau, he completed several internships in 
the banking and consulting sector, among others at Deutsche Bank and PwC Deutsche Revision. 
Marcus research focuses on Deutsche Bank and its transformation into a global investment bank. 
His research interest is in the field of corporate finance.
Sebastian Schmidt joined the research team of the Center for Financial Studies in October 2008. Since 
September 2007 he is enrolled in the Ph.D. Program in Economics at Goethe University, where he 
also completed a Diploma in Economics supported by the German National Academic Foundation in 
2008. At the CFS, Sebastian will be working on the “MacroModelBase” project headed by Professor 
Volker Wieland. This initiative aims to build a public archive of macroeconomic models that are used 
by academics, central banks and finance minstries to quantify macroeconomic risks and evaluate 
stabilization policies. It is financially supported by the EU Commission as part of a new research 
network on monetary and fiscal policies in multi-country models (MONFISPOL).
Corinna Wolf joined the CFS research team in November 2008. Corinna holds a degree in business 
administration  and  also  studied  journalism  at  Mainz  University.  While  working  for  the  “CFS 
Financial Center Index” project headed by Professor Jan Krahnen, Corinna continues to work in the 
collateral management section of Deutsche Bundesbank. Her research interests focus on the impact 
of ratings and rating agencies.
Volker Wieland appointed as 
Wim Duisenberg Research Fellow by ECB
Volker Wieland, who is Director of the Center for Financial Studies and Professor of Monetary Theory 
and Policy at Goethe University, has been appointed as Wim Duisenberg Research Fellow by the European 
Central Bank. The Wim Duisenberg Fellowship is awarded annually since 2006 to internationally recognized 
experts in their field of research. In previous years, the Fellowship has been awarded to leading scholars 
such as Albert Marcet (Universitat Pompeu Fabra), Philippe Weil (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and Alex 
Cukiermann (Tel Aviv University). During his eleven month stay at the ECB, Wieland’s focus of research is on the role of money 
supply in the design of monetary policy and on comparative analysis of macroeconomic models. He will also take advantage of 
the opportunity to have a closer look at the practical side of monetary policy.
New Ph.D. Program
In fall 2009, the new Law and Economics of Money and Finance Ph.D. Program will start at the Goethe 
University in Frankfurt. This two-year program will be offered to postgraduates from law and business 
schools. The faculty will be comprised of highly qualified lecturers. In addition to faculty members from 
Goethe University and the Institute for Law and Finance (ILF), professors and researchers from top-
ranked European and North American Universities will visit the program. For more information, please 
consult www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/doctoral.
In fall 2009, the new Law and Economics of Money and Finance Ph.D. Program will start at the Goethe 
University in Frankfurt. This two-year program will be offered to postgraduates from law and business 
schools. The faculty will be comprised of highly qualified lecturers. In addition to faculty members from 
Goethe University and the Institute for Law and Finance (ILF), professors and researchers from top-
ranked European and North American Universities will visit the program. For more information, please 
The Center for Financial Studies lost its founding father and honorary member Prof. Karl H. Häuser. 
Professor Häuser made a significant contribution to the establishment of our research institute in 
1967. At that time, he was Professor for Public Finance at the Goethe University in Frankfurt and he 
became the first director of the Institut für Kapitalmarktforschung (IfK), which later became the 
Center for Financial Studies. He strongly believed that research needed to focus more on capital 
markets, which was at that time a rather neglected discipline at academic institutions in Germany 
and elsewhere. His vision was to stimulate research in this area by bringing together practitioners and academics. 
He paved the way for a discussion platform that still exists today. The CFS Colloquium series still continues to be a 
well-frequented and lively forum for discussion and exchange. After Professor Häuser retired, he continued to show 
a keen interest in the activities of the Center and he regularly attended our events and meetings. With him, the Center 
lost a strong supporter and a charming person who has left his footprint on the financial community in Frankfurt. 
We wish his family much strength in overcoming the loss.
Congratulations to Stephan Späthe
In  November  2008,  the  House  of  Finance  has  extended  its  Executive  Administration,  with  the 
intention  to  have  a  central  point  of  contact  for  all  operational  and  strategic  issues  related  to  the 
House  of  Finance.  Stephan  H.  Späthe,  who  is  a  former  staff  member  of  CFS,  and  Bettina  Stark-
Watzinger  will  be  working  alongside  the  Executive  Director,  Prof.  Wolfgang  König,  to  help 
fulfill  this  objective.  Before  taking  this  position,  Stephan  Späthe  acted  as  coordinator  of  the  CFS
Financial Center Index project headed by Jan Krahnen. We wish him and his colleague a successful start!
Karl Häuser, 
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